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ABSTRACT
Ruan, Yefeng Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2018. A Trust Management Framework
for Decision Support Systems. Major Professor: Arjan Durresi.
In the era of information explosion, it is critical to develop a framework which
can extract useful information and help people to make “educated” decisions. In our
lives, whether we are aware of it, trust has turned out to be very helpful for us to
make decisions. At the same time, cognitive trust, especially in large systems, such
as Facebook, Twitter, and so on, needs support from computer systems. Therefore,
we need a framework that can eﬀectively, but also intuitively, let people express their
trust, and enable the system to automatically and securely summarize the massive
amounts of trust information, so that a user of the system can make “educated”
decisions, or at least not blind decisions.
Inspired by the similarities between human trust and physical measurements, this
dissertation proposes a measurement theory based trust management framework. It
consists of three phases: trust modeling, trust inference, and decision making. Instead
of proposing speciﬁc trust inference formulas, this dissertation proposes a fundamental
framework which is ﬂexible and can be adapted by many diﬀerent inference formulas.
Validation experiments are done on two data sets: the Epinions.com data set and the
Twitter data set.
This dissertation also adapts the measurement theory based trust management
framework for two decision support applications. In the ﬁrst application, the real
stock market data is used as ground truth for the measurement theory based trust
management framework. Basically, the correlation between the sentiment expressed
on Twitter and stock market data is measured. Compared with existing works which
do not diﬀerentiate tweets’ authors, this dissertation analyzes trust among stock

xii
investors on Twitter and uses the trust network to diﬀerentiate tweets’ authors. The
results show that by using the measurement theory based trust framework, Twitter
sentiment valence is able to reﬂect abnormal stock returns better than treating all
the authors as equally important or weighting them by their number of followers.
In the second application, the measurement theory based trust management framework is used to help to detect and prevent from being attacked in cloud computing
scenarios. In this application, each single ﬂow is treated as a measurement. The simulation results show that the measurement theory based trust management framework
is able to provide guidance for cloud administrators and customers to make decisions,
e.g. migrating tasks from suspect nodes to trustworthy nodes, dynamically allocating
resources according to trust information, and managing the trade-oﬀ between the
degree of redundancy and the cost of resources.

1

1 INTRODUCTION
In our lives, all our social interactions are based on trust. On one hand, trust is
an accumulated feeling based on the past social interactions. On the other hand,
trust can help us to make future decisions that guide our future social interactions.
For example, when people interact with others, they evaluate and/or update others’
trustworthiness based on the interactions. At the same time, people make decisions
based on trust assessment results they have, especially for those cases which are
involved with high risk, i.e. stock investment, healthy decisions. Therefore, trust is
an indispensable factor of many decision support systems.

1.1 Problem Statement
Although we know that trust plays an important role in decision making processes,
there still exists some challenges in this ﬁeld. First of all, trust itself is a subjective and
complicated concept. Depending on circumstances and applications, trust has many
diﬀerent interpretations, and consequently, diﬀerent representations and management
principles [1]. Therefore, given various types of raw input data, we need to design a
framework which is able to convert or map from raw input data into trust information.
Besides this, for many large systems, it is very diﬃcult for users or agents to manually
evaluate trustworthiness like in our real lives, where we only have a limited number
of acquaintances to deal with. Therefore, we need a computer framework which is
able to eﬃciently handle trust information in a computerized way.
Secondly, it is very common that large systems are sparsely connected in real
applications [2,3]. This is partly because that we can only evaluate targets with whom
we have direct interactions/measurements. Given such sparsely connected systems
or graphs, one way to alleviate this is to use the existing direct trust relationships to
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infer indirect trust relationships for users who originally are not directly connected,
which is also called “Friend of Friend (FOAF)” [2, 4].
Finally, given both direct and indirect trust information, our purpose is to provide
additional information to help people make decisions in various applications. Decision
making itself is a well developed and complex discipline. In this dissertation, we
mainly focus on how trust can be used to help people or agents make better decisions
compared with the scenarios where trust information is not available.

1.2 Dissertation Statement
To address the existing challenges, this dissertation presents a measurement theory based trust management framework. It simulates the trust evaluation process
following the measurement theory. It is very ﬂexible and can be adapted by various
types of trust inference formulas.
We call the ﬁrst challenge trust modeling. Basically, it maps the available trust
related raw data from the ﬁeld into computerized trust metrics which are deﬁned
in our trust management framework. Inspired by the similarities between the trust
assessment process and physical measurements, this dissertation proposes a new trust
metric, composed of trustworthiness and conﬁdence, which captures both trustworthiness and its certainty.
We call the second challenge trust inference. It is composed of two types of
trust inference operations: trust transitivity and trust aggregation [5, 6]. In our
trust management framework, based on the error propagation theory, we are able
to calculate conﬁdence for inferred trust according to diﬀerent trust transitivity and
aggregation formulas as long as they are derivative.
We call the third challenge decision making. This dissertation presents two applications as examples to illustrate how we can use the trust information derived by
our trust management framework to help making decisions. In the ﬁrst application
example, we use the real stock market data as ground truth. We derive Twitter users’
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inﬂuence based on the trust network. Our results show that by taking into account
trust information, we are able to enlarge the correlation between Twitter sentiment
valence and the real stock market data. In the second application, we use our trust
management framework to help to detect and prevent from being attacked in cloud
computing scenarios. The simulation results show that it is able to provide guidance for the cloud administrators and customers to make decisions, and manage the
trade-oﬀ between the degree of redundancy and the cost of resources.
We represent our trust management framework in Figure 1.1. The above three
challenges are divided into three phases in Figure 1.1. All three phases of trust
processing are dependent on the context, especially Trust Modeling and Decision
Making [7]. For example, depending on the type of decisions, or the risks involved,
we would map appropriately the raw trust data into deﬁned trust metrics. Similarly,
depending on the context, such as risks, we might use diﬀerent formulas to aggregate
and ﬁlter trust in Trust Inference. Finally, in Decision Making, for example, we might
apply diﬀerent levels of trust thresholds when we select a doctor for an important
surgery, compared with when we select a movie. Furthermore, the three phases are
interrelated. The accuracy of our Trust Inference, and its corresponding level of
support in Decision Making, will depend on the availability and granularity of trust
data from the ﬁeld. While Trust Modeling and Decision Making can place constraints
on the context, such as limitations from the raw data or the type of decisions, Trust
Inference should not limit the potential of the raw data, but potentially increase it,
by leading to more trustworthy decisions.

1.3 Dissertation Organization
The outline of the dissertation and a brief overview of the chapters are presented
in this section.
In Chapter 2, we provide a literature review of existing trust management frameworks for online social communities. We also list four commonly seen types of attacks
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Figure 1.1. Three phases of trust management framework

in this ﬁeld, and analyze existing frameworks’ vulnerabilities to these four types of attacks. Speciﬁcally, this survey focuses on trust modeling, trust inference, and attacks
in this ﬁeld.
In Chapter 3, we propose a trust management framework based on measurement
theory. Furthermore, based on the error propagation theory, we propose a method to
compute conﬁdence for inferred conﬁdence according to diﬀerent trust transitivity and
aggregation formulas. We perform experiments on two real data sets, Epinions.com
data set and Twitter data set, to validate our trust management framework. Also,
we show that inferring indirect trust can connect more pairs of users.
In Chapter 4, we use the real stock market data as ground truth for our trust
management framework. We apply our trust management framework to build a userto-user trust network for Twitter users. Based on the user-to-user trust network, we
measure Twitter users’ inﬂuence in the ﬁeld of stock investment. Our results show
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that trust network based reputation mechanism can amplify the correlation between
a speciﬁc ﬁrm’s Twitter sentiment valence and the ﬁrm’s stock abnormal returns.
In Chapter 5, we apply our trust management framework to help cloud vendors
and customers to detect and prevent from being aﬀected by potential attacks. We
show that our trust management framework is able to provide guidance for the administrators to make decisions, e.g. migrating tasks from suspect nodes to trustworthy
nodes, dynamically allocating resources, and managing the trade-oﬀ between the degree of redundancy and the cost of resources. In addition, it can be used to calculate
systems’ reliability based on the real-time trust information.
In Chapter 6, we conclude this dissertation and provide directions for future work.
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2 A SURVEY OF TRUST MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS FOR ONLINE
SOCIAL COMMUNITIES
2.1 Introduction
Due to the development of the Internet and computer-based devices, especially
smart phones, people are now moving at least part of their social activities to online
environments. In the last few years, many online social networks, such as Facebook
and Twitter, have spread out around the world. Participants in such kinds of social
networks can have a large number of claimed friends. Some of them may be well
known, while some are not. One possible way to deal with this problem is to diﬀerentiate them by using trust metrics. In [8], authors diﬀerentiated “claimed friends”
from “real friends” on Twitter by counting the number of interactive tweets that two
users post toward each other. Besides social networks, many other online applications
also exhibit social properties, for example e-commerce [9, 10], like eBay [11], Amazon and Epinions [12], and Peer-to-Peer ﬁle sharing networks [13, 14]. Here, we call
them online social communities in which participants can be users, agents, devices,
or others.
We have seen that trust plays an extremely important role in online social communities, as well as in people’s lives; however, there are some challenges in applying
trust in online social communities [15]. First of all, we have to represent trust in a
computational model. Trust is not easy to model in a computational way because of
its subjective property [1]. Also, it cannot be applied directly in online social communities due to diﬀerent features that online social communities have from traditional
social networks [16]. For example in real life, people only have a limited number of
friends to evaluate, but this number explodes in online social communities. On Facebook and Twitter, users can have thousands of friends. Apart from this, in real life,
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trust is developed slowly over time, based on face-to-face social experiences; however,
this is very diﬃcult in online social communities due to the large number of potential
friends. Therefore, trust in online social communities must be computational such
that it can be processed by computers [1, 16]. The diﬃculty is that trust is a subjective concept, and it has diﬀerent meanings in diﬀerent ﬁelds and applications [17,18].
For example, in Amazon, participants use stars to represent to what extent they think
others’ reviews are useful. While in other cases, such as in Peer-to-Peer networks,
trust measures the quality of downloaded ﬁles, downloading speed, and so on [13,19].
Therefore, trust modeling should be dependent on applications or scenarios. In the
remainder of this work, we use the term trust modeling to denote how to represent
trust in a computational way.
Besides trust modeling, another challenge is how to infer indirect trust information
among two unconnected participants. In many online communities, only a small
number of participants are directly connected, compared with the potential number
of pairs of participants. Many works have shown that online communities are sparsely
connected [8, 16, 20–22]. Therefore, it is urgent to introduce mechanisms that can be
used to infer indirect trust among participants who are not directly connected. Such
type of framework is described as “Friend of a Friend (FOAF)”. Basically, trust
propagates along chains; however, how to propagate trust is still an open debate.
Both general and application speciﬁc mechanisms are proposed by many researchers
in this ﬁeld [4, 23–31].
As shown in Figure 1.1, in this work we use the term trust management frameworks
to denote the schemes dealing with how to represent, infer, and use trust. We provide a survey for existing trust management frameworks used in various online social
communities. We mainly focus on two challenges – trust modeling and trust inference. Although there are several survey papers about computational trust [32–34] and
global trust/reputation related attacks [35–37], the main contribution of this chapter
includes:
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• We provide a survey for trust inference problem, which takes into account inferring indirect trust relationship for not directly connected participants.
• We provide a survey for four types of local trust related attacks, and analyze
existing schemes’ vulnerabilities to them.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.2, we investigate
various deﬁnitions of trust, and introduce some related works. In Section 2.3, we
review how existing schemes deal with the ﬁrst challenge – trust modeling. In Section
2.4, we illustrate the second challenge – trust inference, and survey several existing
schemes in this ﬁeld. In Section 2.5, we illustrate four types of attacks existed in trust
management frameworks. In Section 2.6, we analyze existing schemes’ vulnerabilities
to the four types of attacks. In Section 2.7, we conclude this chapter.

2.2 Background and Related Works
2.2.1 Deﬁnition of Trust
Trust is a relationship existing between two participants. In this chapter, we use
truster and trustee to denote them. Trustee is the participant being evaluated by the
truster. For example, when we say A trusts B, A is the truster and B is the trustee.
Trust is studied and used in a number of disciplines, such as sociology, psychology,
economics, computer science, and so on. As a result, there are many deﬁnitions for
trust and no general consensus has been achieved so far [38,39]. Among them, one of
the recent summarized deﬁnition is given by [39]:
“Trust is the willingness of the trustor (evaluator) to take risk based on a
subjective belief that a trustee (evaluatee) will exhibit reliable behavior to
maximize the trustor’s interest under uncertainty (e.g., ambiguity due to
conﬂicting evidence and/or ignorance caused by complete lack of evidence)
of a given situation based on the cognitive assessment of past experience
with the trustee.” [39].
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In this deﬁnition, trust is explained as the probability of performing a speciﬁc
action. In the ﬁeld of computer science, besides probability, there are many other
representations of trust, such as entropy [40, 41], similarity [42–44], and so on. We
will see diﬀerent types of representations of trust in the following.
Trust can be classiﬁed based on various criteria. In [45], McKnight classiﬁed
it into three categories: impersonal/structural trust, dispositional trust, and personal/interpersonal trust. Impersonal/structural trust is determined by institutional
properties rather than by participants themselves. Dispositional trust represents
participants’ bias trust preferences.

Personal/interpersonal is the participant-to-

participant trust relationship. Among them, personal/interpersonal trust has attracted ample attention from researchers. In this chapter, we mainly focus on personal/interpersonal trust. For simplicity, we call it trust in the following. Trust can
be further divided into functional trust and recommender trust based on the types of
behaviors [46]. Functional trust describes how trustworthy a person is when implementing functions, e.g. how good Alice is as a doctor. Recommender trust measures
how reliable a person’s recommendations are, e.g. how reliable Alice’s recommendations are about doctors. The reason why some trust management frameworks separate
them is that recommender trust is explicitly useful for trust inference.
Trust has many properties, such as subjective, dynamic, asymmetric, context
dependent, transitive, composable, and so on [1, 17, 32]. Similar to its deﬁnition,
diﬀerent applications highlight diﬀerent aspects of its properties. Here we list some
properties that are very common in online social communities.
• Subjective. For the same trustee, diﬀerent trusters can have diﬀerent trust
evaluations, even given the same observations [1, 32]. Also, the same trust level
may have diﬀerent meanings for diﬀerent trusters. For example, A may think
80% as very trustworthy, while B may consider it as only a little bit better than
neutral.
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• Asymmetric. As trust is subjective, it is also asymmetric [1,17,34]. A trusts B,
that does not necessarily mean B will trust A. Therefore, when representing
online social communities in graph models, their links are directed.
• Context dependent. Usually the truster trust the trustee for speciﬁc domains
[17, 34]. For example, people think that computer scientists are professionals in
computer networks, but not necessarily are they reliable in medicine.
• Dynamic. Trust is developed over time. In people’s lives, good or positive
experiences will increase trust levels, while trust levels will be decreased by bad
or negative experiences [47]. There are some works proposing that it should
take a large number of positive evidence to build up trust while a few negative
evidence can destroy the trust immediately [48]. Apart from this, the eﬀects of
experiences also diminish over time. A new experience is more important for
the truster to evaluate the trustee than old experiences [13, 49].
• Propagative/transitive. Propagation means that trust can propagate along a
chain [17, 34]. For example, A trusts B, and B also trusts C. To some extent,
A will also trust C, although A does not know C directly. This property is
fundamental for trust inference that we are going to introduce in the following
sections.
• Composable. Besides transitivity, trust is also composable [17]. Giving the
truster multiple trust paths to evaluate the trustee, she/he should be able to
combine all the information. Again there are also many schemes about how to
combine the information.

2.2.2 Trust Management Frameworks
Trust management frameworks are designed to help participants to make better
decisions based on trust information. Jøsang deﬁned it as follows:
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“The activity of creating systems and methods that allow relying parties
to make assessments and decisions regarding the dependability of potential
transactions involving risk, and that also allow players and system owners
to increase and correctly represent the reliability of themselves and their
systems.” [50]
According to [34], trust management frameworks can be divided into three phases:
trust modeling, trust management, and decision making. Trust modeling mainly
deals with how to represent trust relationships in computational models, and trust
management is used to describe how to collect evidence and to do risk evaluation.
Decision making is another important and complicated ﬁeld, and can even be treated
separately [34]. As trust modeling and trust management, together, mainly deal
with how to represent trust in computational models using available raw data, we
incorporate them together and use trust modeling to represent them. Apart from
them, we also include trust inference into trust management frameworks as it is a very
important component for trust management frameworks to work more intelligently
and eﬃciently. Trust inference uses direct trust information among participants to
infer indirect trust information. In this chapter, we mainly focus on trust modeling
and trust inference.
We represent trust management frameworks in Figure 1.1. All three phases are
dependent on context or applications, especially trust modeling and decision making.
For example, depending on the type of available raw data, systems would map appropriately the raw data into deﬁned trust metrics. Similarly, depending on context,
such as risk, systems might use diﬀerent methods to aggregate and ﬁlter trust, in
trust inference. Finally, in decision making, for example, systems might apply different levels of trust thresholds when participants select a doctor for an important
surgery, compared with when they decide whether or not to watch a movie. Furthermore, the three above phases are interrelated. So, the accuracy of trust inference, and
its corresponding level of support in decision making will depend on the availability
and granularity of raw trust data from the ﬁeld.
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2.2.3 Related Works
As online social communities are becoming more popular, there are also more
works investigating trust relationships in this ﬁeld of computer science. As a result,
there are several survey papers in this ﬁeld.
In [32], authors provided a survey for computational trust and reputation models.
It also discussed their properties. In [33], authors provided a survey for trust in the
ﬁeld of E-commerce from economists’ points of view. In [34], authors mainly focused
on the classiﬁcation of trust modeling. It reviewed how trust is represented and what
is the semantic meaning of trust in diﬀerent systems, e.g. rating, probability, fuzzy
logic, etc. Jøsang provided a survey for trust’s categories and semantic meanings
in [11]. Besides trust, he also investigated another trust related concept – reputation. Furthermore, he gave some application examples in the paper, such as Amazon,
Epinions, and Slashdot. Golbeck provided a comprehensive survey on trust modeling
in [18]. It classiﬁes trust based on its objects. Massa reviewed some challenges in
trust management frameworks in [51]. It included how to represent trust in various
types of online systems. Also, it mentioned a few identity related attacks, such as
fake identities and multiple identities. In [17], authors provided a survey for trust in
web-based social networks. It showed how trust is deﬁned in diﬀerent disciplines and
also gave its deﬁnition for web-based social networks. It mainly focused on data collection, trust evaluation and trust dissemination. In [39], authors provided a survey
for trust modeling in complex, composite networks. It included four layers of trust:
communication trust, information trust, social trust and cognitive trust. It reviewed
trust from multiple disciplines’ points of view, such as sociology and psychology.
There are also a few works discussing the relationship between trust and security.
In [35], authors discussed the concept of trust in the ﬁeld of computer security. It
mainly focused on determining initial trust metrics and updating trust metrics based
on observed behaviors. It also described how trust can be used in computer security
applications, such as authentication, intrusion detection, and so on. Similar to [35],
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authors of [36] also discussed the potential usage of trust in E-commerce to counter
attacks. In [52], authors combined social trust and quality-of-service trust for Mobile
Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). It also investigated several potential attacks; however,
attacks discussed are application-oriented. They are speciﬁcally related to MANETs,
such as routing loop attacks, replay attacks, and so on. In [53], authors listed several
requirements of diﬀerent security problems and potential attacks in trust management
frameworks, but without examining existing schemes’ vulnerabilities. In [37], Hoﬀman
et al. provided a survey about potential attacks and defense techniques in reputation
(global trust) systems. While in this chapter, we focus on attacks related with local
trust.
Although there are several surveys existing for trust management frameworks
[32–34], they rarely investigated trust inference. Many of them considered that
trust management frameworks can be used to detect malicious users, but without
considering trust management frameworks themselves can be the targets of attacks.
Some surveys only considered attacks in speciﬁc applications or environments, such
as [35], [36] and [52]. Therefore, in this chapter we provide a comprehensive survey
for trust management frameworks for online social communities, which consider both
trust inference and potential attacks.

2.3 Trust Modeling
In this section, we review how existing works deal with the ﬁrst challenge we
mentioned – trust modeling. As indicated in [34], trust modeling deals with how
to represent trust in computational models using available raw data. In details, it
includes the metrics they used to represent trust, how many dimensions they have,
what is the trust information source, and what are the semantic meanings of trust.
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2.3.1 Trust Metrics
Trust Scaling
As we stated, in order for computers to be able to process trust, it must be
represented in a computational way. Metrics can be either numerical or categorical.
Trust is always represented by numerical values. In the literature, there are two types
of numerical values, discrete and continuous values, used to quantitatively measure
trust. Discrete values come from raw data, such as ratings, scaled metrics, and so
on [46]. Continuous values are also often used in trust management frameworks.
For example, probability based, or similarity based trust metrics [13, 42], are always
continuous. Besides numerical values, trust can also be represented by intervals [54,
55].
• Binary discrete values. One of the most straightforward ways for the truster
to express her/his opinion about the trustee is to use binary metrics – trust or
distrust. In many applications, it is also the ﬁnal goal for the truster to make
a binary decision. There is a large number of research works that model trust
relations using binary metrics [56–59].
• Multinomial discrete values. Although binary metrics are easy for participants
to use and understand, in some cases, trust and distrust may not be suﬃcient
to represent the truster’s opinions. With more scaled metrics, like “very trust”,
“trust”, “distrust” and “very distrust”, participants can evaluate others more
accurately because they have more options [39]. Scaled metrics are commonly
used in questionnaires. They can be converted to discrete values which can be
used in computational models [46, 60].
• Continuous value. Continuous value is another popular way to represent trust.
Due to the semantic meaning of many applications, such as probability and
belief, continuous value is a straightforward way to represent trust. Many works
belong to this category [16, 26, 61–64].
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• Interval. Instead of representing trust using a single value, some works use
intervals to represent trust, as in many cases trust is uncertain. Interval is used
by many fuzzy logic-based trust models. Examples include [54] and [55].

Trust Dimension
In many works [4,13,24,29,59,65], trust is represented by a single value; however,
as trust has many properties, in some cases, two or more parameters are used to
represent trust. In this section, we use the term trust dimension to denote the number
of parameters that are used.
• Separated distrust. In systems that use a single trust value, distrust is considered as the complement of trust. In these systems, high value represents
trustworthy, while low value represents untrustworthy [16, 24]. However, this
is not always true [39]. [2] and [56] and separate distrust from trust and treat
them independently. Besides distrust, [66] introduces untrust and mistrust into
the system.
• Time stamps. As trust is dynamic, it is important for researchers to consider
time stamps for trust status. By incorporating time stamps, trust can be updated and used to defend certain attacks [62]. Example considering time stamps
include [30], [62], [67] and [68].
• Context. Trust is context dependent [39]. The trustee may exhibit diﬀerent
trust degrees or trustworthiness given various types of contexts. For example,
a good babysitter is not necessary a good car repairer. Therefore, many works
are context-aware [30, 46, 63, 69–71].
• Conﬁdence/certainty. Conﬁdence or certainty is used in trust management
frameworks to measure to what extent the truster is certain about her/his trust
assessment. It is considered as an important additional metric in many trust
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management frameworks [2,16,72–74]. Therefore, we illustrate it in more details
in Section 2.3.3.
Furthermore, there are many works that include other dimensions. For example,
Subjective Logic [75] uses relative atomicity to denote the percentage of uncertainty
contributing to the expected belief.

Trust Source
According to [17], trust can be derived from three sources: attitude, experience
and behavior.
• Explicit attitude. Attitude represents the truster’s opinion towards the trustee.
It can be either trust/like/positive or distrust/dislike/negative. Although [17]
indicates that attitude can be derived from interactions or experiences, in
this chapter we only consider explicit attitude information. For example, in
Epinions.com, users express either trust or distrust attitude [12]. Also, for
those systems assuming trust values are directly and explicitly available, such
as [2, 27, 56, 58, 59], we consider them as using explicit attitude.
• Evidence/feedback/experience. When the truster interacts or makes transactions with the trustee, the truster is able to evaluate the trustee’s performance. For example, satisfactory transactions and unsatisfactory transactions
are used to measure trust in [13]. Evidence is used in systems which consider belief theory [26, 74–76]. Also, rating is widely used in many systems
to calculate trust [4, 16, 25, 77]. Note that although these systems all use evidence/feedback/experience, their semantic meanings are diﬀerent. We illustrate
this in Section 2.3.2.
• Behavior. Trust can also be evaluated based on behaviors [17]. In [78] and [79],
authors used reply, forward and retweet behaviors to capture trust information. [80] also uses communication behaviors to measure trust. Besides these
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application speciﬁc behaviors, we also consider similarity as one of the behaviors.
Similarity measure how similar two agents are, for example, their purchasing
behaviors [81,82], common communities they join [83], proﬁle similarity [64,84],
and so on.

2.3.2 Semantic Meanings of Trust
Trust has diﬀerent semantic meanings in diﬀerent scenarios and applications. We
discuss some existing schemes’ semantic meanings of trust in the following. Also, we
note that some systems, such as [24, 56, 85], simply assume trust values are extant
without digging into their semantic meanings.

Evidence or Experience Based Trust
In many cases, participants build up trust based on their prior evidence or experiences. The truster assesses all experiences she/he had with the trustee. Given those
assessments of evidence, there are still multiple methods to model trust.
• Probability. As pointed out by [86], trust can be expressed by the probability
that the trustee will behave as the truster expects. One of the most popular theories used in trust management frameworks is Dempster-Shafer Theory
(DST). Based on DST, Jøsang et al. proposed a model which takes binary
evidence as input and computes trust values [75], as well as many other researchers [26, 74, 76, 87, 88]. In [40], Sun et al. calculated trust based on probability’s entropy. Probability based trust model is a very popular scheme in trust
management frameworks.
• Mean. It is a straightforward way to calculate the mean of evidence as the trust
value. For example, in [16], Zhang et al. used the average ratings (from 1 star
to 5 starts) as trust values.
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• Mode. Given the set of evidence, instead of calculating the mean value, an
alternative way is to ﬁnd the mode of the discrete evidence, such as [46].
• Diﬀerence. Trust value can also be calculated by the diﬀerence between positive
and negative evidence. In [13], authors calculated the diﬀerence ( #positive
evidence − #negative evidence) ﬁrst, and then for each participant p they
normalized local trust values with the summation of p’s all outgoing trust values.

Application Speciﬁc Behavior Based Trust
When calculating trust, some speciﬁc types of behaviors are especially important.
Here we distinguish behaviors from evidence although evidence can be considered as
one speciﬁc type of behavior.
• Conversational behaviors. For example, authors of [79] considered on Twitter
that conversation and forwarding are two factors to determine trust. If two
participants have balanced long term conversations, most likely they trust each
other. Similarly, they assumed that if the truster forwards the trustee’s messages
very frequently, it means that the truster trusts the trustee. In [89], authors
considered retweet and favorite as two trust-related behaviors on Twitter. Also,
authors of [80] used conversational behaviors, such as conversation duration and
frequency, to measure trust.

Similarity Based Trust
Similarity was ﬁrst used in collaborative ﬁltering (CF) recommender systems.
They make recommendations based on the similarity between participants or items
[81, 90]. Similarity can be an additional metric in trust management frameworks in
determining trust [9, 63, 82, 84]. The assumption is that, for participants who are
similar with each other, most likely they also trust each other.
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Reputation
Reputation or global trust is diﬀerent from local trust. We consider it as one type
of trust, as in many systems it is considered in the decision making stage. Reputation
is widely used in many systems, such as e-commerce systems [91] and Peer-to-Peer
networks [92, 93]. Instead of asserting trust metrics for each pair of participants,
each participant only has a unique value which represents how the whole community
(centralized [87]) or part of the community (distributed [69, 94]) evaluates this participant. Furthermore, it can aﬀect agents’ personal/interpersonal trust. Examples
of reputation systems include [65, 69, 92–100].

Fuzzy logic based trust
Because of trust’s nondeterministic property, many works adopted fuzzy logic to
model trust. Unlike traditional logic metrics, fuzzy logic is among completely true and
completely false [101]. Schemes using fuzzy logic to represent trust include [102–105].

Comprehensive trust
Trust is a summarization of complicated human behaviors, and it can be aﬀected
by many factors. Because of its human-related properties, besides the above mentioned factors, some researchers tried to take into account several other factors when
computing trust values [106]. For example, Marsh deﬁned trust from the disciplines
of psychology, sociology, biology and economics, and stated many rational principles
and rules, which are adopted by later works [1]. In [64], Zhan and Fang concluded
that trust is dependent on three components: proﬁle similarity, information reliability
and social opinions. Besides direct connections, authors of [67] also took into account
users’ susceptibility and others’ contagious inﬂuence. In [83], friendship, social contact (based on frequently visited locations) and community of interest contribute to
the trust. In [30], trust is divided into interpersonal trust and impersonal trust. It
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further considers four aspects (benevolence, competence, integrity and predictability)
for interpersonal trust. ReputationPro [70] uses a tree-like structure to compute trust.
In [107], authors calculated trust from four aspects: prestige, familiarity, similarity
and risk of trust.
From the above description, we can see that there exist several diﬀerent representations and meanings for trust depending on speciﬁc scenarios and applications. It is
very diﬃcult to say which one is the best, or which one can outperform another, as
the validation is also application dependent.

2.3.3 Trust and Conﬁdence/Certainty
With the development of trust management frameworks, many researchers found
that trust value itself is not enough to manage trust relationships. In many schemes
[16, 46, 72, 87], researchers introduced another important concept – conﬁdence (or
certainty) into trust management frameworks. Conﬁdence is used to measure how
certain the truster is about her/his trust views about the trustee.
By using conﬁdence, the truster can distinguish distrusted participants from unknown participants. Participants can have diﬀerent levels of conﬁdence even though
they have the same level of trust. For instance, although both distrusted participants
and unknown participants have very low trust levels, the conﬁdence is diﬀerent. Typically, distrusted participants have very high conﬁdence due to their previous bad
behaviors. While unknown participants have very low conﬁdence since they are new
in the communities.
Another important role of conﬁdence is to imply the number of evidence or experiences based on which trust is evaluated. Conﬁdence will increase as the total
number of evidence increases. Conﬁdence is also an important factor in the decision
making stage. For example, when we are faced with high risk events, we may choose
to cooperate with participants that have both high trust levels and high conﬁdence
level.
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Like trust, there are also several ways to represent conﬁdence. In [75], Jøsang et
al. used a multi-tuple to represent belief, disbelief and uncertainty, which sum up to
1.0. In this case, uncertainty is dependent on belief and disbelief. Conﬁdence in [16]
is determined based on the uncertainty in measurement theory. There are also several
works that use similarity based conﬁdence [25, 108], as well as fuzzy theory [109].
In summary, in Table 2.1 we list some schemes and their corresponding representations, semantic meanings, as well as trust dimensions for trust. Also, we examine
each scheme to see if they support trust inference (properties of transitive and composable).

2.4 Trust Inference
The goal of trust management frameworks is to provide participants with trust
information and help them to make decisions; however, in many online communities,
only a limited number of participants are directly connected. Therefore, using existing
direct trust is not suﬃcient. It is urgent to introduce trust management frameworks
which can infer indirect trust by making use of direct trust links [57]. In the ﬁeld of
computer science, there are many proposed trust inference schemes. Some of them
were designed for speciﬁc applications, while some were proposed for general purposes.
We review some existing schemes in this section.
There exist two very important operators in the trust inference schemes: transitivity/concatenation operator and aggregation operator [75, 110]. Transitivity operator
is used to calculate trust propagation in a single chain. It helps participants to evaluate others even though they do not have any prior direct experiences. Aggregation
operator is used for combining parallel trust paths between the truster and the trustee
in case that there exist more than one trust path between them.
In the following, we classify some existing schemes based on the methods they
used to calculate trust transitivity and aggregation. We list the methods they used to
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Table 2.1.
Representations, semantic meanings and properties of trust
Schemes

Trust

Semantic

Trust

Trust

scaling

meaning

dimension

inference

Marsh [1]

Continuous [−1, 1)

Comprehensive

CT, TS

No

Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [46]

Discrete (multinomial)

Evidence based (mode)

CT, CF

Yes

Jøsang [75]

Continuous [0, 1]

Evidence (probability)

DT, CF

Yes

Falcone, Pezzulo et al. [102]

Continuous [−1, 1]

Fuzzy logic

NA

NA

Kamvar, Schlosser et al. [13]

Continuous [0, 1]

Evidence (diﬀerence)

NA

Yes

Guha and Kumar [56]

Discrete (binary)

NA

DT

Yes

Xiong and Liu [69]

Continuous [0, 1]

Reputation

CT, CF

Yes

Golbeck [4]

Continuous [0, 1]

NA

CT

Yes

Sun, Yu et al. [40]

Continuous [−1, 1]

Evidence (entropy)

TS, CT

Yes

Massa and Avesani [24]

Continuous [0, 1]

NA

NA

Yes

Sabestian [76]

Continuous [0, 1]

Evidence (probability)

CT, CF

Yes

Wang and Singh [72]

Continuous [0, 1]

Evidence (probability)

DT, CF

Yes

Uddin, Zulkernine et al. [63]

Continuous [0, 1]

Similarity

TS, CT, CF

Yes

Adali, Escriva et al. [80]

Continuous [0, 1]

Behavior

TS

Yes

Leskkovec, Huttenlocher et al. [58]

Discrete (binary)

NA

NA

NA

Nepal, Sherchan et al. [68]

Continuous [0, 1]

Comprehensive

TS, CT

No

Victor, Cornelis et al. [2]

Continuous [0, 1]

NA

DT, CF

Yes

Zhan and Fang [64]

Continuous [0, 1]

Comprehensive

NA

No

Liu, Wang et al. [85]

Continuous [0, 1]

Comprehensive

NA

Yes

Wang and Wu [73]

Continuous [0, 1]

Evidence (probability)

CF

Yes

O’Doherty, Jouili et al. [29]

Continuous

Comprehensive

NA

No

Zhang and Durresi [16]

Continuous [0, 1]

Evidence (mean)

CF

Yes

Kant and Bharadwaj [103]

Continuous [0, 1]

Fuzzy logic

DT

Yes

Fang, Zhang et al. [67]

Continuous [0, 1]

Comprehensive

TS,CT

Yes

Chen, Guo et al. [83]

Continuous [0, 1]

Comprehensive

NA

Yes

Shakeri and Bafghi [55]

Interval

Evidence

CF

Yes

Liu, Yang et al. [74]

Continuous [0, 1]

Evidence (probability)

DT, CF

Yes

Zhang and Mao [59]

Discrete (binary)

NA

NA

Yes

Aref and Tran [105]

Continuous

Fuzzy logic

TS

No

Fang, Guo et al. [30]

Continuous [0, 1]

Comprehensive

TS, CT

Yes

For trust dimension, DT=Separated Distrust, TS=Time stamp, CT=Context, CF=Conﬁdence/certainty, NA=Not
available.

propagate and aggregate trust separately; however, trust transitivity and aggregation
in some schemes, such as the matrix factorization category, are combined together.
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2.4.1 Multiplication for Transitivity and Weighted Mean of Evidence for Aggregation
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes
In [46], Abdul-Rahman and Hailes divided trust into two categories: direct trust
and recommender trust. Trust in this case has four discrete values: very trustworthy, trustworthy, untrustworthy and very untrustworthy. The truster maintains a set
of prior experiences with the trustee. To determine the trust value, it returns the
mode of four trust degrees. If there are more than one returned trust degrees, it assigns a uncertainty value. Furthermore, trust propagates through recommendations.
The truster compares her/his own experiences with the recommender’s suggestions
and then adjusts the recommender trust accordingly. Experiences are aggregated
by weighted mean, where weights are intermediary participants’ recommender trust.
Similarly, aggregated trust is the mode of four trust degrees.

Jøsang
In [75], Jøsang proposed a model called Subjective Logic that considers trust
as a term of uncertain probability. Trust is represented in two spaces – opinion
(or belief) space and evidence space. Following Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST),
Jøsang deﬁned four important parameters: belief (b), disbelief (d), uncertainty (u)
and relative atomicity (a) in the opinion space, and b + d + u = 1. In the evidence
space, it focuses on binary events: positive evidence (represented by r) and negative
evidence (represented by s). The posterior probability of binary events is represented
by Beta distribution. Furthermore, there exists a mapping between the evidence
space and the opinion space.
It uses discounting and consensus operators to propagate and aggregate trust
correspondingly. Intermediary participants’ recommendations about the trustee are
discounted by their trustworthiness. In trust transitivity, both belief and disbelief
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decrease, while uncertainty increases. This makes sense in real life that uncertainty
increases when introducing more intermediary participants within a chain. Consensus
operator adds evidence together from multiple parallel trust paths and converts them
into the opinion space. Jøsang extended [75] to a new version, which uses conditional
belief reasoning in [111]. As we will see later, Subjective Logic is adopted by many
other researchers in this ﬁeld.

Sabestian
In Sabestian’s model, which is called CertainTrust [76], trust is also represented in
two spaces. Human Trust Interface (HTI) contains trust and certainty. The second
representation focuses on the evidence domain. To determine certainty, it sets a
maximal number (Em ) of expected evidence for each context. Certainty increases
when evidence increases; however, it does not increase linearly. In the beginning, few
evidence can make certainty increase a lot. While there are already a large amount
of evidence, certainty increases not as fast as before. When the number of evidence
is greater than or equal to Em , certainty is normalized to 1. In the evidence domain,
similar to [75], it also uses Beta distribution to model the posterior probability of
binary events. There exists a map between the above two representations. Trust is
equal to the mode of Beta distribution.
For trust transitivity and aggregation, two operators – consensus and discounting,
are deﬁned. Both of the operators ﬁrst calculate in the evidence domain and then
convert to HTI.

Wang and Singh
As in [75], Wang and Singh also represented trust in the evidence space and the
belief space; however they deﬁned certainty diﬀerently in [72]. It has an another important parameter – evidence conﬂict, which represents the ratio of positive evidence
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to the total evidence. In this deﬁnition, certainty is dependent on both the conﬂict
ratio and the number of evidence.
Operators for trust transitivity and aggregation are similar to [75]. Apart from
transitivity and aggregation operators, authors added another operator – selection,
in [112]. Selection operator is used to select reliable trust paths among multiple trust
paths between the truster and the trustee.

Liu, Yang et al.
Apart from belief, disbelief and uncertainty used in Subjective Logic, ASSESSTRUST [74] incorporates another metric: posterior uncertainty. Relatively, it calls
uncertainty deﬁned in Subjective Logic the prior uncertainty. In the evidence space,
it includes three types of evidence: positive, neutral and negative evidence. Mapping
exists between the opinion space and the evidence space using Dirichlet distribution.
Aggregation operator has the same idea as in Subjective Logic, except for extending from binary evidence to tri-nary evidence. In the transitivity operator, instead
of transferring evidence to the prior uncertainty, it transfers evidence to neutral evidence, which in turn increases the posterior uncertainty. In a recursive manner,
ASSESS-TRUST calculates trust from the truster to the trustee using transitivity
and aggregation operator.

2.4.2 Multiplication for Transitivity and Weighted Mean of Trust Values for Aggregation
Kamvar, Schlosser et al.
EigenTrust [13] is mainly designed for Peer-to-Peer ﬁle sharing systems. It measures trust based on the number of satisﬁed and unsatisﬁed experiences. The truster’s
outgoing trust is normalized by the summation of all her/his outgoing links. It
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uses multiplication to propagate trust and aggregates trust by weighted mean, where
weights are intermediary participants’ trust.

Xiong and Liu
PeerTrust [69] is another trust management system designed for Peer-to-Peer networks. It uses reputation based trust metrics. Also, it allows participants to propagate recommendations to their neighbors. It uses weighted mean to aggregate trust;
however, weights are dependent on personalized similarity. Similarity is determined
by two participants’ feedback, number of transactions, credibility of feedback, transaction context factor and community context factor.

Golbeck 2005
In [4], Golbeck proposed a trust management framework – TidalTrust. It uses
weighted mean to combine trust from multiple trust paths. In order to improve
accuracy, it only takes recommendations from trustworthy neighbors, which means
that their trust value is greater than a pre-deﬁned threshold. Also, it sets a limitation
for path lengths because Golbeck believed that inferred trust from a long path is not as
reliable as that from a short path. It is evaluated in a social network called FilmTrust.

Sun, Yu et al.
Sun et al. proposed a trust model in [40] based on entropy – an important measure
of uncertainty in information theory. p denotes the probability that the trustee will
perform the action as the truster expected. Trust is deﬁned by the entropy of p.
Trust is positive when p > 0.5, and it is negative when p < 0.5. When p = 0.5, trust
is equal to 0, which means that the truster is uncertain about the trustee. It uses
weighted mean and only considers recommendations from trustworthy intermediary
participants (whose trust is positive) to aggregate trust.
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Massa and Avesani
In [24], Massa and Avesani proposed a trust model called MoleTrust. It takes two
steps to propagate and aggregate trust. In the ﬁrst step, it takes input the truster,
trust network and trust propagation horizon, and outputs a modiﬁed trust network.
Here the input trust network includes the whole community. Trust propagation horizon limits the maximum number of hops (path length). In the second step, it infers
indirect trust within the modiﬁed trust network (the outcome of the ﬁrst step). It
computes indirect trust in an iterative way, in which the trustworthiness of a node
at distance k only depends on the nodes at distance k − 1. The inferred trust is the
weighted mean of all the accepted incoming links. When selecting incoming links,
only those links whose trust is greater than, or equal to, a threshold will be taken
into account.

Liu, Wang et al.
In [113], Liu, Wang et al. used the product of links’ trust as the prior probability
for trust inference in a single path. The posterior probability is adjusted by the
Bayesian network. It considers social intimacy degree and recommendation role in
the Bayesian network. When there are multiple trust paths between the truster and
the trustee, it uses weighted mean to combine them, where weights are assigned
according to social intimacy degree and recommendation role and adjusted by the
Bayesian network as well. Apart from social intimacy degree and recommendation
role, preference similarity is also taken into account in [85].

Zhang and Durresi
In [16], Zhang and Durresi proposed a trust management framework based on
measurement theory. It considers social interactions among participants as “measurements”. Trust (impression) is similar to “measured value of object”, and conﬁ-
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dence represents the certainty of a “measurement”. So in this model, conﬁdence is
related to the “error” in measurement theory. For trust transitivity, there are three
principles in [16]. Guided by these principles, it uses multiplication to calculate trust
transitivity and weighted mean to calculate trust aggregation. In their work, weights
are trust paths’ conﬁdence.

2.4.3 Selection for Transitivity and Average for Aggregation
Golbeck 2006
Golbeck proposed two algorithms – Rounding algorithm and Nonrounding algorithm, to infer indirect trust for a binary trust network [57]. Participants in [57]
are labeled as either “trusted” or “not trusted”. Good participants refer to those
agreeing with the truster (source) with a certain probability, while bad participant
refers to those who are always opposed to the truster. To infer indirect trust, the
truster directly takes her/his good neighbors’ recommendations, without discounting
them. When there are multiple paths, the truster averages the recommendations. In
the Rounding algorithm, all the participants round the average ratings to {0,1} in
each step. While in the Non-rounding algorithm, all intermediary participants hold
continuous average values, and only the truster does the ﬁnal rounding.

2.4.4 Matrix Propagation
Guha and Kumar
Guha and Kumar took both trust and distrust into account in their work [56]. It
is the ﬁrst work which considers the propagation of distrust. Compared with trust,
propagation of distrust is much more complicated. It deﬁnes two matrices, matrix of
trust T and matrix of distrust D. Matrix of belief B can have two formats, B = T or
B = T −D, depending on applications. It includes four atomic propagation operators
in this scheme: direct propagation (B), Co-citation (B T B), transpose trust (B T ) and

29
trust coupling (BB T ). Direct propagation means that if A trusts B and B also trusts
C, then A trusts C as well. If A1 trusts B1 and B2, and A2 trusts B1, it is probable
that A2 also trusts B2 because A1 and A2 have the same views on B1. This is deﬁned
as Co-citation. Transpose trust means that if A trusts B, then B may trust A back.
In trust coupling, if B and C both trust D, and A trusts B, it implies that A may
trust C. These four operators are combined together forming a propagation matrix
C(B,a) = a1 B + a2 B T B + a3 B T + a4 BB T , where a1 , a2 , a3 , a4 are the weights of four
operators.
There are three models to propagate trust: trust only, one-step distrust and propagated distrust. The trust only model ignores distrust, the one-step distrust model
discounts judgments made by distrusted neighbors, and both trust and distrust can
be propagated in the propagated distrust model. All three models have a limitation
on the chains’ length.

Zhang and Mao
In [59], trust is propagated similar to [56]. But it reduces to two atomic operators:
transposition and forwarding, as other two (co-citation and coupling) can be deduced
from transposition and forwarding. Instead of propagate trust deterministically, it
assumes that transposition and forwarding happen with some probabilities. It also
assumes that there can be a probability that two random participants can be connected without through transposition and forwarding. Given all the information, the
posterior probability of inferred links can be calculated. It uses the factor graph to
represent the dependence between variables (links) and functions (probability functions). In such a way it calculates the posterior probability using belief propagation
algorithm (also known as sum-product algorithm). Final prediction of binary trust is
based on the sorting of the probabilities.

30
2.4.5 t-norm for Transitivity and Weighted Mean for Aggregation
Victor, Cornelis et al.
In [2], Patricia Victor et al. derived trust from bi-lattices. In the deﬁnition,
similar to [56], trust includes both trust degree (t) and distrust degree (d), which are
independent with each other. It means that even if the trust degree is very high, e.g.
t = 0.9, distrust degree can also be very high, e.g. d = 0.9. In this case, t + d > 1.0.
It indicates information contradictory and knowledge defect kd(t, d) = |1 − t − d|.
Certainty can be derived from knowledge defect.
With regard to trust propagation, it only uses trustworthy paths, as distrust information is very complicated and diﬃcult to use. Unlike others, instead of proposing
one trust propagation operator, it lists several operators. It uses weighted mean to
aggregate trust from parallel trust paths. It also proposes several operators based on
how to set weight for each path.

Wang and Wu
In [73], Wang and Wu computed trust and certainty by collecting evidence and
using Dempster-Shafer Theory as in [75]; however they considered multi-dimensional
evidence and trust. They also proposed several selection strategies, such as selecting
primitive dimensions and subsets. To propagate trust, they used the parameterized
family of Frank t-norm [114], in which discounting rate is controlled by the input
parameters. Multiple trust paths are combined by weighted mean, where weights
are derived from certainty of trust paths. They also tackled the problems caused by
shared links (links shared by two or more paths between the truster and the trustee)
and crossing links (links cross two paths) in trust networks.
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Verbiest, Cornelis et al.
Authors of [115] adapted the framework from [2]. It represents trust using bilattices approach; however, to aggregate multiple paths between the truster and the
trustee, [115] uses weighted mean approach where weights are dependent on paths’
length. As increasing paths’ length can decrease inference’s accuracy, it weights paths’
inﬂuence based on the order of paths’ length. Also, it proposes a dynamic horizon
search strategy, in which it sets a global threshold for the length of path; however,
when the shortest paths’ length is less than the global threshold, it only considers
those shortest paths. By incorporating paths’ length into trust inference, it tries to
optimize the trade-oﬀ between coverage and accuracy.

2.4.6 Multiplication for Transitivity and Maximum for Aggregation
Zhao and Li
VectorTrust [116] provides a local trust management framework for Peer-to-Peer
ﬁle sharing systems. It uses a single value to represent trust degree/level. To propagate trust, trust degrees/levels are multiplied together along the chains. And when
there are more than two paths between the pair of users, it selects the most trustworthy path. Note that, only when the truster has no direct trust towards the trustee,
indirect trust will be inferred and used.

Hao, Min et al.
MobiFuzzyTrust [107] models trust in a comprehensive way. It considers prestigebased trust, familiarity-based trust, similarity-based trust and risk, and combines
them to calculate trust value; however, instead of using the numerical values, MobiFuzzyTrust represents trust with linguistic terms. Fuzzy membership functions are
deﬁned to convert trust from numerical values to linguistic terms. To infer indirect
trust, it ﬁrst multiplies numerical values. If there exist more than one path between
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the truster and the trustee, it chooses the path which has the maximum trust value.
Finally, the numerical trust values are converted back to linguistic terms using the
fuzzy membership functions.

2.4.7 Social Theories Based Method
Huang, Kimming et al.
In [117], Huang, Kimming et al. proposed a trust framework based on Probabilistic
Soft Logic (PSL). It uses soft truth values as trust degrees. To infer indirect trust
for unconnected truster and trustee, it follows two social theories – balance theory
and status theory, and develops two rules correspondingly. Speciﬁcally, following the
balance theory, only triangles which contains one or three strong/positive links are
considered as balanced. In status theory, if the truster trusts the trustee, it means
that the trustee has higher status than the truster. Also, it takes reciprocation of
trust into account as another rule for two social theories.

2.4.8 Machine Learning Based Method
As machine learning becomes more popular, there are also many works using
machine learning techniques to predict social links for online social communities [58,
106, 118–120]. In such types of works, each link is labeled as positive or negative.
In [121], authors combined behavior based methods, such as weighted mean and minmax aggregation, and machine learning method – reinforcement learning, together.
In this chapter, we mainly focus on trust management frameworks which are behavior
based.
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2.4.9 Social Theories and Machine Learning Combined Method
Tang, Gao et al.
Tang, Gao et al. proposed a low rank matrix factorization method – hTrust [122]
to predict trust relationships. Besides considering latent factors, it also considers
homophily eﬀect which is widely existed in online social networks. Basically, similar
users are more likely to trust each other than others. Therefore, in the objective
function, it includes the similarity of two users’ latent vectors as one regularization
term.

Yao, Tong et al.
Matri [27] treats trust aspects as latent factors and uses matrix factorization to
predict trust values. Similar to the classic collaborative ﬁltering algorithm, there
are two matrices in Matri: truster matrix and trustee matrix. It also adapts four
trust propagation operators from [56]. Besides these four operators, it also takes
global bias, truster bias and trustee bias into account. It combines four social trust
propagation operators with the matrix factorization method.
We can see from above that many schemes used weighted mean to aggregate
trust from multiple trust paths; however, their weights were assigned diﬀerently. We
summarize their weights in Table 2.2.

2.5 Attacks in Trust Management Frameworks and Corresponding Defense Mechanisms
Security is now a very hot topic in many ﬁelds of computer science [123–125]. Trust
management frameworks can help to mitigate the damage in many applications, such
as access control, authentication, secure service provision and secure routing [53];
however, they themselves can be the targets of malicious attackers, too [126, 127]. In
this section, we discuss several potential attacks in trust management frameworks.
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Table 2.2.
Weights in weighted mean schemes
Schemes

Weights

Abdul-Rahman and Hailes et al. [46]

Recommender trust

Jøsang [75]

Trusters’ direct trust

Sabestian [76]

Product of trust and conﬁdence

Wang and Singh [72]

Trusters’ direct trust

Liu, Yang et al. [74]

Trusters’ direct trust

Kamvar, Schlosser et al. [13]

Trusters’ direct trust

Xiong and Liu [69]

Similarity

Golbeck2005 [4]

Trusters’ direct trust

Sun, Yu et al. [40]

Recommender trust

Massa and Avesani [24]

Trusters’ direct trust

Liu, Wang et al. [113]

Trusters’ direct trust

Zhang and Durresi [16]

Trusters’ direct trust

Attackers in trust management frameworks are malicious participants who are
motivated either by selﬁsh or malicious intentions [128]. Selﬁsh attackers launch attacks for their own beneﬁts, while malicious attackers aim to degrade others’ trust
and then aﬀect the system’s performance [37, 129]. According to [37], attackers can
be classiﬁed into insiders and outsiders. Insiders are those who can get access to the
systems and participate in the systems as normal participants, while outsiders are not
authorized by the systems. Obviously, attackers inside the systems can cause more
damage than outsiders. Therefore, many traditional approaches focus on authenticating participants’ identities by using cryptography primitives [130, 131]. In today’s
life, identity authentication is not suﬃcient. It is very easy for attackers to get into
the systems in many open environment applications [37], which include online social communities. Authorized participants in online social communities may behave
badly, e.g. providing misleading information. In such situations, trust is introduced
for the purpose of helping participants to avoid cooperating with potential malicious
attackers. In [132], Rasmussen and Jansson used hard security to refer identity au-
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thentication, and treated social control mechanisms, e.g. trust, as soft security. In
this chapter we only focus on soft security.
Attackers can behave in various ways for diﬀerent purposes. Based on this, Hoﬀman et al. classiﬁed attacks in reputation systems into self-promoting, whitewashing,
slandering, orchestrated and denial of service [37]. In [53], authors listed misleading
feedback attack, discrimination attack, on-oﬀ attack, Sybil attack and new comer
attack. There are even more types of attacks in [133]. Some of those attacks, such as
self-promoting and slandering, are considered for reputation systems or global trust
only. While some of them are application dependent, e.g. imbalance value attack,
denial of service. In this chapter, we mainly focus on potential attacks that can happen to local trust. We list four types of attacks based on attackers’ behaviors. Note
that we consider Sybil attack [134] as an auxiliary method for attackers to achieve
their goals. So, it can be launched with any of the following attacks.

2.5.1 Naive Attack
As pointed out by [53], attackers may provide misleading recommendations to
their neighbors. Dishonest recommendations can aﬀect users’ decisions. Also, it can
be used in reputation systems to launch the self-promoting attack and slandering
attack by providing negative feedback for good participants and positive feedback for
their conspirators. In the naive attack, attackers blindly provide dishonest recommendations and have no knowledge about the systems. They do not realize that their
dishonest recommendations may not be considered if they are untrustworthy to other
participants.
To defend against the naive attack, when considering intermediary participants’
recommendations, many systems only take into account recommendations from trustworthy neighbors [4, 16, 34, 135]. Using weighted mean, attackers’ recommendations
will be weighted by their own trust levels. Some schemes, such as [4] and [34], set
certain thresholds to select trustworthy paths. In order for the recommendations to
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be considered, trust paths’ trust levels must be higher than the thresholds. In such
cases, if participants do not trust attackers, the dishonest recommendations have no
or very little impact. There exist few other mechanisms to defend against the naive
attack, e.g. clustering [53]; however, we do not consider them in this chapter as we
only focus on trust-based mechanisms.

2.5.2 Traitor Attack
As we discussed, if attackers’ trust levels are low, their recommendations can only
have very little impact on other participants’ decisions. This is intuitive and can
also be learned by attackers. Therefore, it is possible that before attackers begin to
disseminate dishonest recommendations, they will provide honest recommendations
for a period of time in order to become trustworthy neighbors of normal participants.
Such an attack is called the traitor attack (or On-oﬀ attack) in [53, 136] because
attackers can suddenly change their behaviors.
If we only consider a single attacker’s behavior, the traitor attack cannot be completely eliminated. Before the ﬁrst malicious behavior happens, attackers have good
trust levels because of their previously disguised behavior. There is no way to predict attackers’ ﬁrst bad behavior based on their former trust levels. Therefore, when
we discuss the defense to the traitor attack, we refer to defending against attackers’
following consecutive bad behavior. The purpose of defense mechanisms is to detect attackers and remove them or mitigate their impact as soon as possible. One
straightforward way is that bad behavior is given more weight than good behavior [136]. This means that participants have to behave good for a long time in order
to become trustworthy, while their trust can decrease dramatically even if they only
behave badly one time [1, 69]. It requires systems to update trust in a timely manner. Under this situation, attackers’ sequential dishonest recommendations will not
be accepted as their trust decreases immediately after the ﬁrst dishonest recommendations. Apart from this, systems can put higher weights on recent evidence than
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previous evidence such that trust is mainly determined by recent behavior (also called
forgetting factor) [69, 137]. To summarize, these strategies aim to reduce attackers’
trust immediately once they behave badly.

2.5.3 Whitewashing Attack
Attackers having very low trust levels may be interested in discarding their current
identities and re-enter the systems. This is called the whitewashing attack since
attackers can behave as new comers and hide their bad histories [138]. Whitewashing
attack is a very common phenomenon in many online social communities because
participants are able to create identities and re-enter the systems very easily [139].
Whitewashing attack is especially attractive in systems where bad history can lead
to negative trust levels. For example, attackers’ trust is negative because of their
previous malicious behaviors. Then, they only need to re-enter the systems, and
their trust becomes zero, which is better than before.
Defense mechanisms for the whitewashing attack can be divided into two aspects.
First, systems can prevent participants from creating multiple identities or make it
expensive. For instance, some systems require users to provide social security numbers
or biometrics to register for identities. This kind of defense mechanism is related to
hard security, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. On the other hand, systems
can assign the lowest trust levels to the new comers such that there is no incentive for
participants to re-enter the systems again. In those systems which consider conﬁdence,
attackers will lose their former conﬁdence if they re-enter the systems [16]. Of course,
it is a challenge for normal new comers to become trustworthy, which is known as the
cold start problem [140].
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2.5.4 Collusion Attack
Attacks mentioned previously can be launched together by either a single attacker
or several attackers. We refer to the collusion attack the combination of multiple
attacks, and it can be launched by a number of attackers [128, 141].
In order to get identities in a system, malicious users can launch the Sybil attack
ﬁrst. Sybil attack is one of the most popular attacks in online systems. In the
Sybil attack, a single user is able to create many identities and behave as if there
were multiple participants. In some extreme cases, attackers can create millions of
identities such that the system will be dominated by Sybil accounts.
Compared with the above three attacks, the collusion attack is more complicated
and diﬃcult to detect [128]. In the collusion attack, attackers can act in several
diﬀerent ways to achieve their goals. In addition, attackers can divide malicious
identities into diﬀerent groups, and each group has their own responsibility at a
given time. For example, in reputation systems, one group of accounts rate their
conspirators with high trust in order to increase their global trust. Their conspirators
are responsible for disseminating dishonest recommendations. There can be many
other tasks divided among groups. To make it more complicated, attackers can switch
their roles during the process [128].
As the collusion attack is the combination of diﬀerent types of attacks, defense
mechanisms also need to employ several methods together. There are some works
trying to ﬁnd out colluded attackers. In [136], Sun et al. developed a defense mechanism with temporal and correlation analysis. In order to ﬁnd approaches to defend
against the collusion attack, it ﬁrst analyzed one type of the collusion attack, which
they called RepTrap attack. In RepTrap attack, attackers have several features and
behavior patterns. TAUCA, which is the defense mechanism, has three components:
change detection, user correlation calculation and malicious user group identiﬁcation.
Change detector is used to monitor the changing trend of behavior (rating). Then
TAUCA analyzes the correlation among suspicious participants. Finally TAUCA can
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identify malicious participants’ groups. More details about TAUCA can be found
in [136]. Colluded attackers can be considered as clusters in graph models as they are
similar to each other. With this observation, clustering algorithms are used to ﬁnd
out groups of participants in the systems.
From what we discussed above, behavior of the collusion attack can be changed
with diﬀerent attackers’ strategies. Although we have seen examples of defense mechanisms to defend against the collusion attack, we should note that they all have
certain assumptions about attackers’ behavior. For example, in order to develop defense mechanisms, they need to know attackers’ behavior patterns in advance, which
is a tough task in reality.
To summarize, we can see that attackers have many methods to damage the
systems. For example, attackers can launch the Sybil attack and the naive attack
together. Although we discussed some defense mechanisms to deal with such attacks,
there is a great need for further research work in this ﬁeld. More importantly, in
many applications, the defensive strategies should be used together in order to defend
eﬀectively against attackers. Finally, remember that attackers can also learn defense
mechanisms and become immune to them. Therefore, it is like an “Arms race”
between attackers and defense mechanisms.

2.6 Analysis of Vulnerability to Attacks
In the above section, we listed four types of potential attacks in trust management
frameworks. As the collusion attack is dependent on attackers’ strategies which are
diﬀerent in applications, in this section, we analyze existing schemes’ vulnerabilities to
the naive attack, the traitor attack and the whitewashing attack. We examine existing
schemes to see whether they have the defense mechanisms we mentioned in Section
2.5 to defend against corresponding attacks. For those systems which do not consider
trust propagation, such as [1], we do not analyze their vulnerabilities to attacks. Also,
for machine learning based methods, we do not analyze their vulnerabilities.
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Abdul-Rahman and Hailes in [46] proposed a trust management system which
is used in virtual communities. Their model propagates and aggregates trust by
weighted mean, where weights are intermediary participants’ recommender trust.
Therefore, it is robust to the naive attack as naive attackers’ dishonest recommendations will be discounted. Also, the truster updates recommender trust after each
recommendation ﬁnishes. In such situations, if attackers suddenly change their behavior, their recommender trust will be decreased immediately. So it can defend
against the traitor attack as well. But it is vulnerable to the whitewashing attack
as new comers have neutral trust levels, which is better than a bad trust level, e.g.
“very untrustworthy”.
Subjective Logic [75] proposed by Jøsang deﬁnes trust following belief theory. In
this scheme, new comers have the lowest trust, therefore, the whitewashing attack
does not have any impact. In trust transitivity, as evidence is discounted by intermediary participants’ trust, it is robust to the naive attack. Unlike [46], Subjective Logic
does not compare recommendations with the truster’s own experiences. Also, it does
not take into account temporal information and forgetting factor, so it is vulnerable
to the traitor attack. CertainTrust [76], which is built based on Subjective Logic, has
the same characters as Subjective Logic, as well as [74] and [110].
[13] uses normalized local trust for each participant. New comers have the lowest
trust levels, therefore, there is no incentive for attackers to re-enter the system. It
uses weighted mean mechanism to defend against the naive attack. Unfortunately, [13]
does not contain any defense mechanism for the traitor attack. Hence it is vulnerable
to the traitor attack.
Xiong and Liu proposed PeerTrust [69] for Peer-to-Peer networks. It takes many
factors into account in modeling trust, including time decaying, diﬀerent weights for
positive and negative evidence, which makes it robust to the traitor attack. Naive
attackers’ recommendations are discounted by their trust, so it is robust to the naive
attack as well. There is no incentive for attackers to re-enter the system. Those

41
features, combined together, make PeerTrust more robust to the collusion attack
compared with other schemes.
TidalTrust [4] is robust to the naive attack as it uses weighted mean for trust
aggregation. Also, the whitewashing attack is avoided because new comers have the
lowest trust levels; however it does not contain any defense mechanisms for the traitor
attack.
Sun, Yu et al. used a probability based trust in [40]. They put penalties on bad
behavior by dramatically decreasing trust. Also, trust can only increase gradually
even though participants behave very good. Therefore, it is robust to the traitor
attack. As it uses weighted mean for trust transitivity and aggregation, it is robust
to the naive attack. It is vulnerable to the whitewashing attack as new comers have
better trust levels than bad participants (negative levels).
In MoleTrust [24], Massa used one continuous value to represent trust. Because
only trustworthy paths will be accepted in his model, it is robust to the naive attack.
It is also robust to the whitewashing attack as new comers have the lowest trust. But
it is vulnerable to the traitor attack.
[113] uses weighted mean as well, so it is robust to the naive attack. Although
it takes recommendation roles into account, it does not update them after each recommendation. Therefore, it is vulnerable to the traitor attack. Because new comers
have the lowest trust levels, it is robust to the whitewashing attack.
In [16], trust evaluation is considered as a “measurement”. Trust is deﬁned by
rating values between participants and conﬁdence is related to the number of ratings.
Both of them are continuous values between 0 and 1. Their model is robust to the
naive attack and the whitewashing attack as it uses weighted mean and assigns the
lowest trust levels for new comers.
In [57], Golbeck proposed a scheme to infer binary trust in social networks. When
considering recommendations, only trustworthy neighbors’ recommendations are selected. Therefore, it is robust to the naive attack. It is also robust to the whitewashing
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attack as new comers are not trustworthy in the beginning; however it is vulnerable
to the traitor attack.
Guha [56] used four atomic operators to calculate trust and distrust matrices.
In his model, both trust and distrust can be propagated. As he used distrust, the
whitewashing attack is possible in his model. Trust is discounted when it propagates
through the chains, so it is robust to the naive attack. Unfortunately, it is vulnerable
to the traitor attack. [59] adopts Guha’s work [56] and changes four atomic operators
to two. But they have the same characters regarding attacks.
Victor used bi-lattice based trust in [2]. Knowledge defect captures to what extent
participants are certain about their estimations. It is vulnerable to the whitewashing
attack as new comers have better trust levels than bad participants. As it considers
thresholds in trust transitivity, it is robust to the naive attack. It is vulnerable to the
traitor attack as there is no defense mechanisms. [115] has the same properties.
[73] evaluates trust similar to [75], therefore, it is robust to the whitewashing
attack. It uses the parameterized family of Frank t-norm to combine trust paths,
where discounting rates are controlled by participants. So it provides opportunity to
defend against the naive attack. It does not update the discounting rate, hence it is
vulnerable to the traitor attack.
[117] propagates and aggregates trust following balance theory and status theory.
In this cases, the inferred trust is determined by the corresponding triangles. Therefore, it is vulnerable to the naive attack and the traitor attack. It is unclear for the
whitewashing attack as the lowest trust value is dependent on speciﬁc applications.
[116] and [107] only select the most trustworthy paths to aggregate trust paths.
Therefore, they are robust to the naive attack. Also, as the new comer has the lowest
trust degree, both of them are robust to the whitewashing attack.
We summarize the above analyzed results in Table 2.3. For each type of attack,
if the scheme is robust to the attack, we list which mechanism is used accordingly.
For those schemes which are vulnerable to the attacks, we represent it by “No” in
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the corresponding attacks. We can see that although the naive attack is considered
in many schemes, only few schemes take the traitor attack into account.
Table 2.3.
Vulnerability to attacks
Schemes

Naive attack

Abdul-Rahman, Hailes et al. [46]

Weighted mean

Traitor attack
Updating

Whitewashing attack
No

recommender trust
Jøsang [75]

Weighted mean

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Sabestian [76]

Weighted mean

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Wang and Singh [72]

Weighted mean

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Liu, Yang et al. [74]

Weighted mean

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Kamvar, Schlosser et al. [13]

Weighted mean

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Xiong and Liu [69]

Weighted mean

Forgetting factor,

Lowest trust level for new comer

time window
Golbeck2005 [4]

Weighted mean

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Sun, Yu et al. [40]

Weighted mean

Forgetting factor

No

Massa and Avesani [24]

Weighted mean

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Liu, Wang et al. [85]

Weighted mean

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Zhang and Durresi [16]

Weighted mean

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Golbeck2006 [57]

Threshold

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Guha and Kumar [56]

Weighted mean

No

No

Zhang and Mao [59]

Weighted mean

No

No

Victor, Cornelis et al. [2]

Threshold

No

No

Threshold

No

No

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Verbiest, Cornelis et al. [115]
Wang and Wu [73]

Weights adjusted
by Bayesian network

Huang, Kimmig et al. [117]

No

No

Dependent on applications

Zhan and Li [116]

Most trustworthy path

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

Hao, Min et al. [107]

Most trustworthy path

No

Lowest trust level for new comer

2.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the urgent need of trust management frameworks in
many online social communities. We investigated how trust is deﬁned by researchers
from diﬀerent disciplines and how can it be represented in the ﬁeld of computer
science. As we can see, it has various computational models depending on how

44
people understand it. The deﬁnitions and representations of trust are basics for trust
management frameworks. Besides trust, conﬁdence is another important concept in
trust-based systems.
Furthermore, we presented diﬀerent trust management schemes. Many of them
have two important operators: transitivity and aggregation operators. This can
largely increase the number of connected participants. Transitivity operator is used
to infer indirect trust for two participants who originally are not directly connected.
Aggregation operator, which always works together with transitivity operator, deals
with the situation when there are more than one parallel trust path between the
truster and the trustee.
Finally, we reviewed some potential trust attacks in trust management frameworks. We described four types of behaviors in these attacks. We analyzed existing
schemes’ vulnerabilities to the attacks. If they are robust to the attacks, we listed
which defense mechanisms they use.
Compared with previous survey papers in this ﬁeld, we provided a comprehensive
survey that takes two challenges – trust modeling and trust inference, into account.
In addition to that, we also discussed four types of potential attacks that can happen
in trust management frameworks.
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3 A MEASUREMENT THEORY BASED TRUST MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction
Trust is a complicated human behavior developed during our evolution. Depending on circumstances and applications, trust has many diﬀerent interpretations, and
consequently, diﬀerent representations and management principles [1]. Trust has been
a hot research topic in many ﬁelds, such as psychology, sociology, IT systems, and
so on. For example, trust has been used in electronic markets, such as eBay [142],
in Internet of Things [143], and in Peer-to-Peer systems [144]. In such applications,
trust is constructed by algorithms through observing past events, such as positive or
negative evidences or feedback [75, 144, 145].
In recent years, the explosive success of online social networks has encouraged the
exploration of new directions for computerized trust representations and management
of (cognitive) trust [110, 146–150]. Cognitive trust is especially useful in cases where
it is diﬃcult for computers to evaluate evidences; however, human trust, especially
in large online social communities, such as Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, etc, needs
support from computer systems. Due to the large amount of available data in today’s
information age, it is impossible for users to handle trust like in real lives, where
people only have a limited number of acquaintances [16].
Therefore, we need a framework that can eﬀectively, but also intuitively, let people
express their trust, and enable the system to automatically and securely summarize
the massive amounts of trust information, so that a user of the system can make
“educated” decisions, or at least not blind decisions. In this chapter, we focus on
two perspectives of trust: how to represent trust, and how to manage trust in online
social communities. A lot of research has been done in this ﬁeld [3, 4, 56, 110, 151].
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For example, Subjective Logic [75,152] has been developed to express and manipulate
subjective trust based on the Dempster-Shafer belief theory [153].
Trust has turned out to be very helpful for users to make decisions [154]; however,
in many online social communities, existing user-to-user trust relationships are very
limited when compared with the number of all potential pairs of users [2, 3]. As
in real life, users can only evaluate others with whom they have direct interactions.
Unfortunately, such user-to-user direct trust relationships are not suﬃcient, which
always results in sparsely connected online social communities. One common way to
alleviate this is to use existing user-to-user direct trust relationships to infer indirect
trust relationships for users who are not directly connected [2, 4].
We develop our approach based on the similarities between human trust and
measurements [155]. They are both evaluations of some values, enhanced by repeating
the evaluations. Furthermore, the “error”, which is used to express the certainty
in measurement theory and statistics [155], is similar to humans’ conﬁdence when
people assess trust relationships. Basically, the larger is the error, the smaller is the
conﬁdence. For variable x, given a range of estimation [x̄ − δ1 , x̄ + δ2 ], there is a
certain probability that the true value x̂ lies in this range [155]. For example, in
Normal distribution, [x̄ − δ, x̄ + δ] (here δ is the standard error) corresponds to 68%
conﬁdence level. In addition, when we propagate trust, we must take into account the
corresponding conﬁdence, similar to the theory of error propagation, which integrates
single step errors in a chain of measurements.
We adapt our framework to several speciﬁc trust inference formulas. Besides Epinions.com, we also collect another data set from Twitter and establish trust network
within it. To infer indirect trust relationships, we use diﬀerent formulas in two online
social communities. And we ﬁnd that diﬀerent communities or data sets have their
own trust inference patterns. Our main contributions include:
• Establish user-to-user trust networks for two real online social communities:
Epinions.com and Twitter;
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• Propose a general trust management framework which is based on measurement
theory to study and infer indirect trust relationships;
• Our framework is ﬂexible and can be adapted to various trust inference formulas;
• Show that online social communities have diﬀerent patterns such that selecting
trust inference formulas for diﬀerent applications is important;
• Show one beneﬁt of inferring indirect trust – mitigating the sparsity problem in
online social communities.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we introduce background about trust processing as well as some related works. In Section 3.3, we state
the similarity between trust and measurement theory, and deﬁne the trust metric.
In Section 3.4, we then describe our measurement theory based trust management
framework and two important trust inferring operations. In Section 3.5, according
to existing works, we list several transitivity and aggregation formulas. In Section
3.6, we do experiments on two data sets in order to validate our framework, and then
analyze results . In Section 3.7, we show one of the main beneﬁts of using the trust
management framework to infer indirect trust relationships. Finally, we conclude this
chapter in Section 3.8.

3.2 Background and Related Works
3.2.1 Trust Processing in Online Social Communities
The goal of trust management systems is to provide users with trust information
and help them make decisions. As shown in Figure 1.1, we divide trust processing into
three major phases. Trust Modeling deals with mapping the available trust related
raw data from the ﬁeld into trust metrics. For example, in Epinions.com, users
have reviews and propositions; in Facebook, users have likes and dislikes, and so on.
Such data has to be translated into trust metrics, which are intrinsic components
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of the trust management framework. Trust Inference focuses on propagating and
aggregating the obtained trust metrics over the whole network, or over the part of
interest. Finally, in Decision Making, the produced trust knowledge obtained by trust
management is used to support various decision making.
All three phases of trust processing are dependent on the context and are interrelated. The accuracy of our Trust Inference, and its corresponding level of support in
Decision Making, will depend on the availability and granularity of trust data from
the ﬁeld. While Trust Modeling and Decision Making can place constraints on the
context, such as limitations from the raw data or the type of decisions, Trust Inference
should not limit the potential of the raw data, but potentially increase it, by leading
to more trustworthy decisions.

3.2.2 Related Works
Trust in online social communities has been attracting more attention from computer scientists. Consequently, many trust management frameworks have been proposed in recent years [156, 157].
A. Jøsang proposed a model called Subjective Logic in [75] that considers trust as
a term of uncertain probabilities based on the Dempster-Shafer belief theory [153]. It
has two spaces: opinion (or belief) space and evidence space. In the opinion space,
there are four metrics: belief, disbelief, uncertainty and relative atomicity. In the
evidence space, it includes positive and negative evidence. Metrics in two spaces
can be converted into each other. When considering trust transitivity, transitive
belief will be discounted by multiplying beliefs along the chain. In the cases that
there are more than one path between two users, evidence will be added together
ﬁrst and then be converted into the opinion space. However, it does not consider
conﬂict ratio when calculating conﬁdence. Conﬁdence in Subjective Logic is only
related with the amount of evidence. Y. Wang et al. [72] proposed a framework
based on Subjective Logic, as well as S. Ries [76]. Shin [158] takes into account
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unreachable witness, which is based on common acquaintances. A selection operator
is introduced in [112]. Both [72] and [158] deﬁne conﬁdence based on the deviation
between evidence’s distribution and uniform distribution. Although they take both
the amount of evidence and conﬂict ratio into account in calculating conﬁdence,
it is more diﬃcult than Subjective Logic to convert between evidence space and
trust space. As indicated by [72], there is no closed-form solution for conversion
function. Therefore they are more computationally expensive than Subjective Logic.
Our framework captures both the amount of evidence and conﬂict ratio. At the same
time, it is simple to derive conﬁdence from error.
[159] models trust using Hidden Markov Model. It considers reputation for two
users when local trust is not available. TRAVOS [160] models trust using Beta
distribution. It considers third-parties’ opinions only if the direct conﬁdence is below
a threshold. However, it can only be applied in cases where evidence is binary. Our
framework can be applied in cases no matter that evidence is represented as binary
or continuous.
MoleTrust [20] ﬁrst selects a sub-graph of the whole network, which contains the
source user’s (truster) contacts that are reachable within the limited number of hops.
It then calculates trust in an iterative way in the sub-graph, using the weighted mean.
It sets a trust threshold during computing; only those edges whose trust values are
greater than, or equal to the threshold, will be taken into account for transitivity and
aggregation. Introducing threshold can improve accuracy, but it reduces the number of pairs of users that can be connected. H. Tosun and J. W. Sheppard adapted
MoleTrust in [135] for a better trade-oﬀ between them. Similar to MoleTrust, TidalTrust [4] also uses the weighted mean to calculate trust transitivity and aggregation.
However, both MoleTrust and TidalTrust do not consider conﬁdence. Y. Sun et
al., [40] proposed a trust model based on entropy. They deﬁned three axioms to infer
indirect trust. Also, [40] does not consider conﬁdence. To propagate trust, RATE [3]
diﬀerentiates neighbors or recommenders based on four metrics: trustworthiness, expertise, uncertainty and cost.
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R. Guha is the ﬁrst one among computer scientists taking both trust and distrust into account [56]. It represents user-to-user trust relationships in matrices, and
includes four operators. Indirect trust is predicted by multiplying trust matrix (or
distrust matrix) with four operations. The ﬁnal trust representation is more like
reputation rather than personal trust perspectives. [122] predicts indirect trust using
matrix factorization approach, with user homophily as a regularization term. These
two works are more like machine learning approaches.
For those diﬀerent schemes, [161] proposes a framework to evaluate and compare
reputation systems’ performance. The existing works mainly focus on trust modeling (based on evidence, probability, belief theory, and so on) and trust propagation
formulas (i.e. multiplication, evidence accumulation, averaging, and so on). In this
chapter, we propose a trust management framework which has two metrics: trustworthiness and conﬁdence. We propose a simple measurement of conﬁdence directly
based on the error in the measurement theory, which is a well-accepted theory for general measurement purpose. More important, by using the error propagation theory
which can be used for many general functions, conﬁdence can be easily calculated for
trust transitivity and aggregation formulas. The error propagation theory is a wellestablished theory in the ﬁeld of error analysis [162]. Given input x and its error, it is
easy to calculate the propagated error of f (x), as long as f is derivative. Therefore,
unlike other works that stick to speciﬁc trust transitivity and aggregation formulas,
i.e. multiplication, our framework is ﬂexible and can be adapted to various transitivity and aggregation formulas. Although there are some existing works that include
conﬁdence as well [26, 160], our computation of conﬁdence is much simpler. Similar
to [26], conﬁdence in our framework captures both the number of measurements and
their distribution (which reﬂects conﬂict ratio).
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3.3 Trust Metric Inspired by Measurement Theory and Psychology
Measurement theory, which is a well developed and proven ﬁeld of knowledge,
quantiﬁes the diﬀerence between the measured value and the corresponding objective
value [163]. Additionally, a number of notations, categorized as approximation error
(or “error” in general), are introduced to represent the accuracy, precision or uncertainty of a “measurement” [164], such as absolute error, relative error, conﬁdence
interval, and so on.

3.3.1 Psychology Implication
People develop their impressions about others based on their interactions and
incidents. Furthermore, feedback is gathered and processed by the brain that revises
the accumulated impression, which is generally called “trust” [1]. This repeating
process makes our evaluation of trust regarding people or other entities more concrete:
How trustworthy are they? For example, as indicated by [7], positive experiences will
increase trust. This formed trust can be used later to support decision making.
Physical measurements possess similar characteristics of human trust evaluation.
People get an initial evaluation about a given physical quantity by measuring it using
the appropriate equipment. They can then improve the measurement accuracy by
using more precise equipment, combining diﬀerent measurement methods, or repeating the measurement. Such similarity inspires us to adapt the well established and
proven measurement theory in representing and computing trust relations in online
social communities.

3.3.2 Trust Metrics: Trustworthiness and Conﬁdence
In our framework, we use two metrics – trustworthiness and conﬁdence, together to
represent trust. We ﬁrst introduce the trustworthiness (or can be called impression in
the scenario of human trust) metric m as a person’s (say Alice’s) comprehensive sum-
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mary of multiple “measurements” on another person’s (say Bob’s) trustworthiness,
through their real life experiences including personal direct and indirect contacts in
their social context. Although the speciﬁc processing methods are diﬀerent, this summarization is very similar to the averaging of sample measurements in statistics [165];
however, the concrete meaning of m depends on speciﬁc scenarios and applications.
For example, m could be considered as a quality value (e.g., how good is Bob), a
probability (e.g., how likely Bob will keep promises), and so on. Some widely used
representations of trust are: binary metrics [56], scaled metrics [46, 60], probability
based metrics [26, 62] and similarity based metrics [82, 84, 166]. Our framework can
deal with both discrete and continuous metrics. In this framework, suppose that we
have a set of measurement results M = {m1 , m2 , ...mk }, then trustworthiness m is
deﬁned as in Equation 3.1.
Pi=k
m=

i=1

k

mi

(3.1)

Similar to sampling in statistics, depending on the number of incidents and the intensity of each experience, Alice would have a distribution of measurements in a range
around the summarized trustworthiness m. Such a distribution, which in fact shows
to what extent Alice is conﬁdent about her trustworthiness assessment, is similar to
“error” in physical measurements, which represents the variance of the actual value
from the summarized value. Therefore, we introduce the second metric: conﬁdence
c. From the psychological perspective, conﬁdence c represents how much a person
is certain about his/her trustworthiness metric, and from the statistical perspective,
c determines how far away from the “real” trustworthiness the “measured” one can
be. Therefore, we associate c with “variance” or “error” of measurement theory, in
an inversely proportional manner. It is intuitive that the smaller the “variance” or
“error” is, the higher the conﬁdence. Therefore, in our framework, a trust tuple
contains trustworthiness m and conﬁdence c, which can be represented as T (m, c).
Basically, trustworthiness/impression m measures how trustworthy the trustee is in
the truster’s point of view. And, conﬁdence c measures how conﬁdent the truster is
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about the evaluation of trustworthiness/impression m. In our framework, m and c
together compose trust T .

3.3.3 Value and Interval of Trust Metrics
One way of asking people’s opinions about other entities is to let them assign
approximate values in a given interval, which is referred to as a “scaled question”
in surveys and questionnaires. For example, “Likert-Scale” [167] lets users express
their induction of past experiences, and then selected options or values that can be
converted into predeﬁned trustworthiness metrics m. In our framework, we deﬁne
both the value of m and c as continuous values in [0, 1]. A higher trust value means
that a person is more trustworthy. For example, 0 means most untrustworthy, while
1 refers to most trustworthy.
In order to utilize the error propagation theory to compute transitive and aggregated trust (discussed in the later section), we must be able to convert conﬁdence
c to error in a corresponding form. As a result, we further introduce another intermediate metric: range R, which is deduced from conﬁdence c. If we consider c as
the percentage of known fact, then the percentage of uncertain fact would be 1 − c.
Therefore, R is the total trustworthiness interval times the percentage of uncertain
fact. Generally, for a trust tuple T (m = 0.5, c = 0) which is the most neutral and
uncertain trust, we would like the possible trustworthiness value [m − R2 , m + R2 ] to
cover the whole interval, i.e., the “real” trustworthiness value could be any value in
[0, 1]. On the contrary, when c = 1, which represents the highest conﬁdence, we would
like R = 0, which means both the worst and best expected trustworthiness equals
to m. Following these guidelines, the relation between conﬁdence and range can be
simply deﬁned as: R = 1 ∗ (1 − c) = 1 − c.
To better ﬁt the error characteristic, radius r, which is half of range R is introduced. r shows how far the best or worst expected trustworthiness can be from the
summarized trustworthiness value m. Therefore, in this deﬁnition m is equivalent to
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the measurement mean, and r is equivalent to the standard error of the mean [168].
Conversion between r and c can be written as Equation 3.2.
⎧
⎪
⎨1 − 2 ∗ r, if r ≤ 0.5
1−c
c=
and
r=
⎪
2
⎩0,
otherwise

(3.2)

To illustrate the relationship among m, c and r, we give a Normal distribution
example in Figure 3.1. Here, the black line represents the mean of measurements mi ,
which is the trustworthiness m. The blue line represents the standard error r, and
conﬁdence c = 1 − 2 ∗ r can be represented by red line. Basically, more consistent
are the measurement results, smaller is the standard error r, which results in higher
conﬁdence.

Figure 3.1. The relation among m, c and r

3.4 Trust Inference Framework
The fundamental assumption for frameworks inferring indirect trust is that trust
is transitive. This is also supported by some psychologists and sociologists, such as
Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust. They stated in their book [169]:
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“Holland and Leinhardt (1972) provide strong, statistical evidence that
transitivity is a very important structural tendency in social networks.”
[169, 170].
In the previous example, we can call Alice the truster or evaluator who evaluates
Bob’s trustworthiness, and Bob on the other hand can be called the trustee or evaluation target whose trust is evaluated by Alice. If we treat the evaluator, the evaluation
target, and all intermediate users as nodes in the graph, indirect trust relation builds
a path that starts from the evaluator and ends at the evaluation target, connected
by all intermediate users [5, 6]. For example, on Facebook, users (i.e. B) are able to
recommend their friends (i.e. C) to other friends (i.e. A).
Error, which represents “uncertainty” in statistics, can be propagated and accumulated when a system is assembled from components each of which introduces
diﬀerent levels of error in measurement. The error propagation theory is then constructed to summarize the overall error of the system based on statistics theory. In
this section we discuss the trust inference based on the error propagation theory using the trust metric m and c, and how we adapt them to comply with psychological
implications.
There are two types of trust propagation operations: trust transitivity and trust
aggregation [5,6]. We illustrate them using the scenario where node A is the evaluator,
and node Z is the evaluation target. Node B is the intermediate node between node
A and node Z. Node B can provide recommendations to node A, since node B knows
node Z.

3.4.1 Trust Transitivity
Based on trust’s transitivity property, in the above case, node A trusts node B
and node B trusts node Z, and to some extent node A also trusts node Z. We denote
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the operation of transitive trust as ⊗. Then node A’s indirect evaluation of node Z
via node B is represented as:
TZA:B = TBA ⊗ TZB

(3.3)

This is a concatenation of trust path A-B and B-Z using node B as a connecting
node for trust transitivity. TBA and TZB can be either direct trust or an abstraction of
transitive trust. In the case that TBA or TZB are already indirect transitive trust, TZA:B
extends to more than two hops.

Principles of Trust Transitivity
The formulas designed for computing transitive trust should comply with psychological observations. We list the following desired principles, similar to other previous
works [6, 62, 171]:
• TPrinciple1: Trust transitivity will not increase conﬁdence under all circumB
≤ min{cA
stances, i.e. cA:B
Z
B , cZ }.

• TPrinciple2: Trust transitivity will not increase the original trustworthiness
B
under all circumstances, i.e. mA:B
≤ min{mA
B , mZ }, because without other
Z

proof, the transitive trustworthiness would not be better than the original one.
Note that, here we consider the scenario that node A only gets knowledge about
node Z through node B. In the case that node A has additional paths to learn
about node Z, it is possible that node A will have a higher trustworthiness
about node Z than does node B.
• TPrinciple3: The closer the link to the evaluator, the stronger the inﬂuence it
A
A:B
has on the transitive trust. This means cA
(mZA:B )
B (mB ) has more weight in cZ
B
than cB
Z (mZ ).
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3.4.2 Trust Aggregation
Trust aggregation is developed to summarize the propagated trust from multiple
parallel trust paths. We use operator ⊕ to denote trust aggregation operation. For
example, if node A has two parallel trust paths towards node Z, A-B-Z and A-C-Z,
then the aggregated evaluation of node Z in node A’s point of view via node B and
node C is denoted as:
A:(B,C)

TZ

= TZA:B ⊕ TZA:C

(3.4)

Principles of Trust Aggregation
Similar to trust transitivity, we list some desired principles for trust aggregation.
• APrinciple1: Aggregation may increase conﬁdence if similar information is received from multiple paths, as it increases the volume of evidence; however, this
principle may introduce vulnerability when a number of adversaries post the
same misleading information to a victim.
• APrinciple2: Conﬁdence may decrease if it contains contradictory information
received from diﬀerent paths. That is, a concrete positive trustworthiness and
a concrete negative trustworthiness about the same target would produce a
neutral but vague trust assessment.
• APrinciple3: Trustworthiness with higher conﬁdence should have more inﬂuence
on the aggregated trust than those with lower conﬁdence.
Note that although we listed the above desired principles for trust transitivity and
aggregation, as indicated by [2], not necessary all the principles will be satisﬁed by
all the formulas we will demonstrate in the following section.
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3.4.3 Calculating Uncertainty Based on Error Propagation Theory
Radius (or error) r of transitivity and aggregation operations can be calculated
based on the error propagation theory. Given a set of variables which have error (or
uncertainty), the error propagation theory (also called propagation of uncertainty) is
used to calculate the error (or uncertainty) of a function of the variables [172]. Although we have not listed speciﬁc arithmetic functions or formulas for trust transitivity and aggregation here, we describe the general idea of how to calculate radius/error
for them. Here we only take into account two trust tuples T1 (m1 , c1 ) and T2 (m2 , c2 ).
It is easy to extend to more than two trust tuples. We represent transitivity or aggregation formulas in a general function as f (m1 , m2 ). Then the radius of function
rf can be computed as Equation 3.5 [172]:
rf2 = (

∂f 2 2
∂f 2 2
∂f ∂f
) r1 + (
) r2 + 2
cov(m1 , m2 )
∂m1
∂m2
∂m1 ∂m2

(3.5)

Here cov(m1 , m2 ) is the covariance between T1 and T2 . In the case that T1 and T2
are independent, the covariance becomes zero.
We can see that the radius can be calculated for any format of arithmetic formulas
using the error propagation theory. Therefore, our framework is very ﬂexible and can
be adapted to various transitivity and aggregation formulas. To summarize, error
propagation is used to calculate conﬁdence of trust propagation. In the later section,
we will explore several diﬀerent formulas for trust transitivity and aggregation.

3.5 Formulas for Trust Transitivity and Aggregation
In this section, we list some arithmetic formulas, which are widely used among
computer scientists, for trust transitivity and aggregation. Remember that a trust
tuple contains m and c in our framework. After deﬁning formulas for m, conﬁdence c
and radius r can be computed accordingly by following the error propagation theory.
Besides the formulas listed here, our framework can be adapted to other arithmetic
formulas easily as long as they are derivable.
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3.5.1 Transitivity Formulas
Following the principles inspired by human common sense, several formulas have
been proposed to deal with trust transitivity. The three transitivity formulas listed
below all have their speciﬁc focuses and make sense in some speciﬁc scenarios. Among
them, it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd out which one is the best, since trust propagation
behavior patterns are diﬀerent in many applications. We will show their performances
on two real data sets in the later section.

Transitivity Formula One (TP1)
Multiplication is one of the most straightforward formulas used to compute trust
transitivity in many existing works [2, 4, 13, 16, 62, 173]. We denote it as T P 1 in this
work, and represent it as:
B
A
B
mA
B ⊗ mZ = mB ∗ mZ
q
A
B
A 2
A 2
B 2
2
rB ⊗ rZ = (mB
Z ) ∗ (rB ) + (mB ) ∗ (rZ )

(TP1)
(TP1)

B
Note, when calculating the radius, we assume that mA
B and mZ are independent.

This assumption applies for all the following formulas.
The idea of using multiplication for trust transitivity is that node B’s recommendation about node Z will be discounted by node B’s trustworthiness in node A’s
B
A
B
point of view. As m ≤ 1, mA
B ⊗ mZ ≤ min{mB , mZ }, it satisﬁes TPrinciple1 listed in

Section 3.4.1. Apart from discounting trust along the chain, multiplication can even
ﬁlter out untrustworthy paths by setting a threshold. For example, in some cases,
node A only considers suggestions from her/his trustworthy friends. This mechanism
provides potential usage of defending attacks.

Transitivity Formula Two (TP2)
When considering trust transitivity, most likely friends of friends are also friends;
however, it is more complex when considering an enemy’s recommendations. In some
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cases, the truster/evaluator discards those untrustworthy paths; however, distrust
information may also be valuable for inferring indirect trust. One simple example
is that enemies of enemies can be friends. To capture this idea, we list the second
transitivity formula T P 2 as in [62]. It is not guaranteed to satisfy any transitivity
principles listed in Section 3.4.1.
B
A
B
A
B
mA
B ⊗ mZ = mB ∗ mZ + (1 − mB ) ∗ (1 − mZ )
A
rB

⊗

rZB

q
B 2
B
A 2
2
2
= (2 ∗ mA
B − 1) ∗ (rZ ) + (2 ∗ mZ − 1) ∗ (rB )

(TP2)
(TP2)

B
In this case, friends of friends are still friends; however, if both mA
B and mZ are

very low, which means A and B, B and Z are enemies, enemies of enemies result in
friends too.

Transitivity Formula Three (TP3)
Another formula for trust transitivity is obtaining the minimum m of the chain as
the transitive trust, which is represented as minimum t-norm [2]. Correspondingly,
conﬁdence associated with the minimum m is selected as the transitive conﬁdence.
If there are more than one link has the same minimum m, we select the minimum
conﬁdence among these links.
B
A
B
mA
B ⊗ mZ = mmin = min(mB , mZ )

(TP3)

A
rB
⊗ rZB = max(ri where mi = mmin )

(TP3)

The idea behind this formula is that trust will decrease as long as one of the links
in the chain is very low. The minimum impression in this case is the bottleneck of
the chain. Straightforwardly, it satisﬁes TPrinciple1.
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3.5.2 Aggregation Formulas
In this section, we list ﬁve arithmetic aggregation formulas which are widely used
in this ﬁeld. Similar to transitivity formulas, their performances on various applications are also diﬀerent.

Aggregation Formula One (AP1)
Given multiple parallel paths, one simple way to aggregate them together is to
average them. It means that all paths are considered equally important, such as [57].
mA:B
Z

⊕

mZA:C
r

rZA:B ⊕ rZA:C =

mZA:B + mZA:C
=
2
1
((rA:B )2 + (rZA:C )2 )
22 Z

(AP1)
(AP1)

Note that, here we use two parallel paths as an example as well as in the following
discussion. It is easy to extend them to more than two parallel paths cases.

Aggregation Formula Two (AP2)
Although averaging is very popular in several cases, it is not able to distinguish
paths from each other. For example, paths can have diﬀerent length and conﬁdence.
Under such situations, many researchers proposed to use the weighted mean [4, 16,
20, 62], in which paths are assigned with diﬀerent weights accordingly. Generally, it
can be written as:
w1 ∗ mA:B
+ w ∗ mA:C
Z
Z
P 2
wi

(AP2)

1
P
(w2 ∗ (rZA:B )2 + w22 ∗ (rZA:C )2 )
( wi )2 1

(AP2)

mA:B
⊕ mZA:C =
Z
s
rZA:B ⊕ rZA:C =

There are several ways to assign weights for paths. For example, weights are
assigned according to conﬁdence in [16]. Paths with higher conﬁdence also have
higher weights when compared with lower conﬁdence paths. Also, weights can be
assigned according to the value of trustworthiness m of the ﬁrst hop, for example,
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A
mA
B and mC in the above case [62]. The reason why the ﬁrst hop is so important is

that it is the only direct information that the evaluator has.

Aggregation Formula Three (AP3)
The third arithmetic aggregation formula is derived from the law of the probability
of the union of two events [174]. The probability of the union event EA and EB,
when EA and EB are independent, can be represented as:
P (EA ∪ EB) = P (EA) + P (EB) − P (EA ∩ EB)
= P (EA) + P (EB) − P (EA) ∗ P (EB)
Similarly, we list the third aggregation formula as in [40]:

rZA:B

⊕

rZA:C

mA:B
⊕ mZA:C = mZA:B + mZA:C − mZA:B ∗ mZA:C
Z

(AP3)

q
A:B 2
A:B 2
A:C 2
2
= (1 − mA:C
Z ) ∗ (rZ ) + (1 − mZ ) ∗ (rZ )

(AP3)

This formula makes sense for applications which interpret trust as probability. It
calculates the probability that at least one of two paths is trustworthy.

Aggregation Formula Four (AP4)
The forth aggregation formula is called the strongest path [175]. Among several
parallel paths, the evaluator chooses the one which has the highest trustworthiness m.
Correspondingly, that path’s conﬁdence will be selected as the aggregated conﬁdence.
In the cases where there are two or more parallel paths having the same highest m,
it picks up the one having the highest c among them. Therefore, it is also called ﬁrst
trust then conﬁdence.
mA:B
⊕ mZA:C = mmax = max(mZA:B , mZA:C )
Z

(AP4)

A:B
rB
⊕ rZA:C = min(ri where mi = mmax )

(AP4)
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Aggregation Formula Five (AP5)
Instead of ﬁrst trust then conﬁdence, we can also aggregate trust ﬁrst according to
conﬁdence, then trust [175]. In this scenario, the truster/evaluator prefers to select the
path which has the highest conﬁdence. Correspondingly, that path’s trustworthiness
m will be selected as the aggregated trustworthiness. This is a more conservative
methodology when compared with the ﬁrst trust then conﬁdence methodology.
A:B
rB
⊕ rZA:C = rmax , where cmax = max(cZA:B , cZA:C )

(AP5)

mZA:B ⊕ mZA:C = max(mi where ci = cmax )

(AP5)

3.6 Validation Experiments and Results Analysis
In order to validate the accuracy and the potential usage of our trust management
framework, we perform a series of experiments on two data sets. The ﬁrst one was
from a real world online social community – Epinions.com, which was collected by
the authors of [176]. Another data set was collected from Twitter by us.

3.6.1 Data Sets Description
Epinions.com Data Set
Epinions.com is a general online customer review site. At Epinions.com, users can
publish reviews regarding commercial products. Other users can rate the published
reviews from 1 to 5 stars, which represent their opinions of the reviews from the least
useful to the most useful respectively. Users are identiﬁed by IDs, so each user can only
rate a review article, at most, one time. Also, users can express their propositions,
i.e., trust judgment about other users with like, neutral, or dislike. Although other
works [56,176] use propositions as trust, alternatively we use ratings to build up trust
relationships in our experiments. We compare users’ propositions with the average
ratings between the corresponding pairs of users in Table 3.1. We can see that the
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average ratings are coherent with subjective propositions. 72.6% of users rated their
disliked users with low ratings (less than 3 stars). And to those whom users like,
95.2% of them gave very high ratings (more than 4 stars).
Table 3.1.
Average review ratings for three subjective propositions
Average review ratings
Proposition

Total

(0,1]

(1,2]

(2,3]

(3,4]

(4,5]

4

631

1667

18108

403926

(.0001%)

(.149%)

(.393%)

(4.267%)

(95.190%)

1429

180549

452773

992545

2738327

(.033%)

(4.136%)

(10.371%)

(22.735%)

(62.725%)

71

26357

6525

4288

8189

(.156%)

(58.017%)

(14.363%)

(9.439%)

(18.026%)

review
Like

Neutral

Dislike

424336

4365623

45430

This data set contains 405, 154 distinct user IDs. Among them, 95, 318 users gave
subjective propositions towards other users, and 120, 492 users rated review articles
written by others. In total, 153, 265 users gave either ratings or propositions or both.
On the other hand, 84, 601 users received subjective propositions from others, and
132, 586 users received ratings for their reviews. In total, 158, 143 users received either
ratings or propositions or both. Based on our deﬁnition of trust for the Epinions.com
data set (deﬁned in Section 3.6.2), there are 78, 468 users having trust relationships.

Twitter Data Set
Twitter is a web-based micro-blogging service which has been in service since
2006. Many applications have been developed based on Twitter data, such as tracing
disasters [177], stock market [79, 178], elections [179], and spam detection [180].
We collected our data set from Twitter in which all the users were the followers
of a public stock market account named StockTwits. We ﬁrst retrieved users’ IDs
and then used these IDs to retrieve their tweets, which were written in English. We
developed an application using Twitter API as well as twitter4J library. Note that
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Twitter API limits data collecting up to 3, 200 tweets from a single user’s time line.
The data set consisted of users’ screen names, locations, tweets, and the date and time
when they posted the tweets. We took a snapshot of users in that group in February,
2015, which had 401, 052 followers. And from the followers’ time lines, we collected
all the tweets posted before February 9th, 2015, for a total number of 38, 748, 723
tweets. In addition to the followers, we also included users to whom the followers had
posted interactive tweets. Based on our deﬁnition of trust for the Twitter data set
(deﬁned in Section 3.6.2), there are 2, 067, 284 users having trust relationships.

3.6.2 Trust Modeling
The main goal of trust modeling is to evaluate trust metrics m and c from the raw
data sets. As shown in Figure 1.1, this phase is context dependent. We separately
deal with trust modeling for the Epinions.com and the Twitter data sets.

Trust Modeling for Epinions.com Data Set
As we indicated, we use ratings to synthesize the trustworthiness m. For a trust
relation from user A to user Z, the trustworthiness m is the average of ratings that A
rates Z’s review articles. It is then converted into value in [0, 1], as shown in Equation
3.6. Each rating is treated as one measurement. Following measurement theory,
radius (or error) consists of two parts: Random Error (rr ) and Systematic Error (rs ).
Random error is associated with the distribution of ratings around the mean. And
systematic error is due to diﬀerent components of the measuring system [155], such
as external factors and measurement resolutions. In our framework, we only consider
the measurement resolution. It is determined by the measurement scale. Finally, the
error is combined in Equation 3.8.
mA
Z

Pi=N
=

ratingi
5∗N

i=1

(3.6)
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s
rr =

i=N
Σi=1
(xi − x̄)2
scale
√
rs =
N (N − 1)
2∗ 3
p
r = rr2 + rs2

(3.7)
(3.8)

In our case, one star is equivalent to 0.2 when converted into the interval of [0, 1].
The scale in Equation 3.7 is 0.2. We use r to denote radius (or error), and conﬁdence
c can be derived based on r as deﬁned in Equation 3.2. Also note that in Equation
3.7, N , which is the number of measurements, has to be greater than 1. For this
reason we only consider the pairs of users which contains at least two ratings between
them.

Trust Modeling for Twitter Data Set
To model trust for Twitter, like [181], as shown below, we will take into account
several textual and behavioral features. Twitter allows users to post short tweets
(140 characters maximum per tweet). Some types of tweets are designed for special
purposes. They are mentions, replies, and retweets. One common feature of these
three types of tweets is that they all contain the symbol “@”, and all of them are
used to tweet toward speciﬁc users and are considered as part of interactions (or
conversations) among the users [182].
Since we want to know whether or not one user trusts another user, we need to
evaluate her/his attitude towards the target user by analyzing the tweets that she/he
posted towards the target user. Similar to Epinions.com, we treat each interactive
tweet as one measurement. Tweets reﬂect users’ opinions on persons, objects, or even
aspects of objects. Similar to [183], we build up trust based on sentiment analysis results. There are some complex works about text sentiment evaluations [184]; however
tweets are very short compared with regular documents. For simplicity, we assume
that interactive tweets are always targeted at users they are posted towards. Tweets,
based on their contents, can be divided into positive and negative tweets. We use
SentiStrength [185] to analyze the sentiment result for each tweet in our data set. It
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gives us a discrete value from −4 to +4 for each tweet. Then we convert it into the
interval [0, 1], using

sentiment+4
.
8

As we derive users’ opinions based on sentiment analysis, it is very important
for us to ﬁnd an accurate sentiment analysis tool. Unfortunately such tools are
very subjective. We select SentiStrength [185] for our experiments. We evaluate its
performance on text reviews whose sentiments are known. We collected a data set
from Yelp’s 2014 competition, which provided both text messages and ratings [186].
In this data set, there were 1, 125, 458 text reviews that users wrote towards the
business (e.g. restaurants). Associated with the text reviews, users also gave ratings
from 1 star to 5 stars (335, 022 reviews which contain both text and ratings). It
is reasonable to assume that the users’ text reviews are consistent with their star
ratings. For example, if a user writes a negative text review for a restaurant, most
likely the rating associated with the corresponding text review is also very low (for
example, 1 or 2 stars).
In order to compare the sentiment analysis results with the users’ ratings, we
convert them into the same interval [0, 1]. SentiStrength distinguishes sentiment
results using eight discrete values, from −4 to +4. While users’ ratings are expressed
from 1 star to 5 stars, the conversion can be found in Equation 3.9. We denote v
as the converted value, rating and sentiment represent star ratings and sentiment
results correspondingly. As we can see, 1 star and −4 (in sentiment result) correspond
to v = 0, 5 star and +4 correspond to v = 1. The result shows us that SentiStrength’s
sentiment results are very close to the users’ ratings (the mean absolute error is equal
to 0.8972 star).
v=

rating − 1
4

v=

sentiment + 4
8

(3.9)

Having sentiment result for each tweet, we could now calculate the trustworthiness
m by treating each tweet as one measurement. Instead of just averaging all the tweets,
we divide them into diﬀerent windows based on the time line since people interact
with each other in diﬀerent periods of time. We try to capture these time-based
characteristics of human behavior. We cluster the tweets posted in the same month
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into the same window. As we will see later, we treat these windows diﬀerently. In
each window, we group tweets based on days. In each day, we calculate the mean
trustworthiness md for that speciﬁc day, as well as cd . Note that the scale in this case
is 0.125, as SentiStrength returns discrete values from −4 to +4.
After calculated md and cd for each day, we use the weighted mean to combine
the results for each month in Equation 3.10.
mmonth =
Here we use wi =

1
,
r2

Σi=31
i=1 wi mi
Σi=31
i=1 wi

(3.10)

to assign higher weights to those which have higher conﬁdence

(or smaller errors). And the error of weighted mean is expressed as Equation 3.11.
e2month =

1
Σi=31
i=1 wi

(3.11)

Having calculated trustworthiness and error for each window for one month,
we then combine them together. In each window, as in one period of time, the
truster/evaluator has an impression on the target; however, this impression faded
with time. For example, if the truster/evaluator just evaluated the target a few days
ago, she/he may be quite sure about her/his trustworthiness assessment; however, if
the evaluator “measured” the target several months ago, the impression has somehow
faded. So we introduce a forgetting factor σ, where σ is less than 1, to capture this
eﬀect on the users’ conﬁdence. Also, because of the forgetting eﬀect, we only focus
on tweets which were posted in 2014. Therefore, we have 12 windows in total (from
January to December). The conﬁdence of December, which is the latest month, is
not discounted. The conﬁdence of November is discounted by σ, and the conﬁdence
of October is discounted by σ 2 , and so on, as shown in Equation 3.12, where i is the
number of the corresponding month (i.e. i = 1 for January and i = 2 for February).
0

ci = ci ∗ σ 12−i

(3.12)

Similarly, we combine all the windows’ results using the weighted mean where
0

weights are their conﬁdence c . We select one month as the length of time window and
the forgetting factor σ = 0.9 in this chapter. Further reﬁnement of these parameters
will be part of our future work.
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3.6.3 Validation Experiments
To measure the accuracy of our trust management framework, we use the leaveone-out method to compare predicted indirect trust with actual trust, as shown in
Figure 3.2. To predict A’s trust about Z, we remove the actual direct trust link
from the network and keep all other trust paths. We then use trust transitivity and
aggregation formulas to infer indirect trust and compare it with the removed actual
trust.

Figure 3.2. Predicting indirect trust with leave-one-out method
For AP 2, we use w = c in the following experiments, which is the same as in [16].
Accuracy is measured by classical mean absolute error (MAE) and classical root mean
square error (RMSE). We use dif f m to represent the absolute diﬀerence between the
inferred m and actual m, and dif f c for the absolute diﬀerence between the inferred
c and actual c accordingly. Additionally, to consider dif f m and dif f c together, we
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also measure MAE and RMSE for Manhattan distances, which is deﬁned in Equation
3.13. Note, the interval of MAE of Manhattan distances is [0, 2].
Pn
|dif f mi | + |dif f ci |
M AE(M an) = i=1
n

(3.13)

3.6.4 Result Analysis
In this section, we show the performances of diﬀerent combinations of transitivity
and aggregation formulas using two data sets. As [4] points out, inferred indirect
trust becomes unreliable when the length of the chains increases. We only take into
account the chains containing two hops (contain only one intermediate node). We
will see their performances in cases which have three hops in the later section. In
addition to 15 possible combinations, we also add a baseline methodology, in which
we randomly assign values in [0, 1] for inferred m and c.
Table 3.2.
Formulas’ performances on the Epinions.com data set (two hops)
MAE

RMSE

MAE

RMSE

MAE

RMSE

(diﬀm)

(diﬀm)

(diﬀc)

(diﬀc)

(Man)

(Man)

TP1,AP1

0.0565

0.0827

0.1021

0.1170

0.1585

0.1433

TP1,AP2

0.0596

0.0924

0.0353

0.0630

0.0948

0.1118

TP1,AP3

0.0620

0.1250

0.1357

0.1476

0.1977

0.1934

TP1,AP4

0.0511

0.1036

0.0514

0.0653

0.1026

0.1224

TP1,AP5

0.1815

0.2497

0.0427

0.0614

0.2242

0.2572

TP2,AP1

0.0554

0.0808

0.1049

0.1197

0.1603

0.1444

TP2,AP2

0.0589

0.0906

0.0371

0.0659

0.0960

0.1121

TP2,AP3

0.0619

0.1248

0.1359

0.1476

0.1978

0.1933

TP2,AP4

0.0510

0.1032

0.0501

0.0629

0.1012

0.1208

TP2,AP5

0.2063

0.2656

0.0463

0.0705

0.2526

0.2748

TP3,AP1

0.0526

0.0783

0.1070

0.1215

0.1597

0.1446

TP3,AP2

0.0553

0.0870

0.0531

0.0750

0.1084

0.1149

Formulas

TP3,AP3

0.0619

0.1249

0.1354

0.1478

0.1973

0.1935

TP3,AP4

0.0513

0.1038

0.0265

0.0629

0.0778

0.1214

TP3,AP5

0.0559

0.1106

0.0257

0.0621

0.0816

0.1268

Baseline

0.4526

0.5346

0.3823

0.4643

0.8349

0.7081
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Table 3.3.
Formulas’ performances on the Twitter data set (two hops)
MAE

RMSE

MAE

RMSE

MAE

RMSE

(diﬀm)

(diﬀm)

(diﬀc)

(diﬀc)

(Man)

(Man)

TP1,AP1

0.2336

0.2527

0.1559

0.1946

0.3895

0.3189

TP1,AP2

0.2342

0.2533

0.1552

0.1937

0.3894

0.3189

TP1,AP3

0.2209

0.2475

0.1483

0.1838

0.3693

0.3083

TP1,AP4

0.2207

0.2409

0.1457

0.1800

0.3665

0.3008

TP1,AP5

0.2386

0.2590

0.1536

0.1923

0.3922

0.3226

TP2,AP1

0.1037

0.1456

0.2729

0.3250

0.3766

0.3562

TP2,AP2

0.1038

0.1457

0.2729

0.3252

0.3767

0.3563

TP2,AP3

0.1556

0.2198

0.2758

0.3279

0.4314

0.3948

TP2,AP4

0.1047

0.1468

0.2670

0.3192

0.3717

0.3514

TP2,AP5

0.1037

0.1460

0.2783

0.3305

0.3820

0.3613

TP3,AP1

0.0692

0.1220

0.1224

0.2087

0.1916

0.2418

TP3,AP2

0.0694

0.1224

0.1238

0.2115

0.1932

0.2444

TP3,AP3

0.1133

0.1909

0.1267

0.2156

0.2400

0.2879

TP3,AP4

0.0669

0.1218

0.1185

0.2103

0.1854

0.2430

TP3,AP5

0.0701

0.1258

0.1255

0.2188

0.1955

0.2524

Baseline

0.3620

0.4416

0.3665

0.4472

0.7285

0.6285

Formulas

We ﬁnd 1, 449, 750 leave-one-out cases (or triads) in the Epinions.com data set,
and 4, 791, 751 triads in the Twitter data set. Table 3.2 shows their performances on
the Epinions.com data set, and Table 3.3 shows their performances on the Twitter
data set. Note that three transitivity and ﬁve aggregation formulas which are from
existing works represent corresponding behavior patterns. Therefore, Table 3.2 and
3.3 compare diﬀerent behavior patterns’ performance in two online communities.
In both data sets, we can see that 15 combinations of formulas, inspired by some
principles, perform much better than the baseline methodology. To better illustrate
the prediction accuracy on two data sets, for the combination of T P 3 and AP 2
formulas, we show dif f m and dif f c in both data sets in Figure 3.3. We divide
dif f m and dif f c into small cells. Each cell has its length (Δdif f m) and width
(Δdif f c) equal to 0.01, i.e. 0.00 ≤ dif f m < 0.01 and 0.10 ≤ dif f c < 0.11, which
results in total 10, 000 cells. We then count the number of triads in each cell. From
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them we can see that most triads have very small dif f m and dif f c at the same time,
i.e. dif f m < 0.1 and dif f c < 0.1.
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Figure 3.3. Occurrence of diﬀm and diﬀc in two data sets using TP3
and AP2 formulas
These formulas achieve diﬀerent prediction accuracy on two data sets. As we
can see, overall, the performances on the Twitter data set is not as good as on
the Epinions.com data set. One possible reason is that ratings in Epinions.com are
given by users themselves, and they reﬂects the users’ real preferences. While, in
Twitter, we use a common sentiment analysis tool to evaluate all the users’ tweets.
First of all, it is very diﬃcult to assess sentiment analysis tools as their outputs are
subjective. Although we test SentiStrength on Yelp’s data set, Twitter may exhibit
diﬀerent properties from Yelp. Second, we use the same criteria to assess all the tweets
without considering their authors’ diﬀerent preferences. Remember that human trust
is subjective, which means diﬀerent users can have diﬀerent feelings even when they
write the same texts. This is captured in Epinions.com, because ratings are based on
the users’ own preferences.
Apart from this, we note one interesting phenomenon in our experiments. In
the Epinions.com data set, the aggregation formula plays a dominant role in their
performances. As long as we select the aggregation formula, the results change only
a little even if we try diﬀerent transitivity formulas. However, in the Twitter data set
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transitivity formulas dominate the performances. This phenomenon, so far, is still
unexplained.
Furthermore, one important observation from our experiments is that formulas
perform diﬀerently on the two data sets. For example, T P 1 and AP 4 achieve a very
good accuracy in the Epinions.com data set compared with other formulas. In the
Twitter data set, their performance is worse than some other formulas. This indicates
that formulas which have diﬀerent views or focuses on diﬀerent speciﬁc aspects of
trust, such as a conservative view vs. an optimistic view, perform diﬀerently. This
is because data sets, or applications themselves, have biased trends. It is possible
that one formula’s underlying meaning ﬁts this application very well, but does not
make sense for others. In other words, whether or not formulas can perform well
depends on if they match the applications trust propagation patterns. Therefore,
instead of proposing speciﬁc formulas, we propose a fundamental framework which
can be adapted by many diﬀerent formulas.

3.6.5 Filtering Paths by Conﬁdence
As many existing works [4, 20] suggest, when there exist multiple paths between
the truster and the trustee, it is important to select trustworthy paths to consider
in trust aggregation. TidalTrust [4] selects the strongest paths. And MoleTrust [20]
sets a threshold, and only paths whose trust values are above the threshold are taken
into account in trust aggregation.
In this chapter, we propose a simple approach to calculate conﬁdence based on
error (Equation 3.2). Apart from trustworthiness evaluation, conﬁdence provides
information about how certain that evaluation is. To show one of the beneﬁts of
using conﬁdence, as in TidalTrust and MoleTrust, we use weighted mean for trust
aggregation. Besides using trustworthiness (m) as a selection criteria, we also use
conﬁdence (c) as a selection criteria. In Equation 3.14, j represents nodes which have
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direct trust relationship with s, and are reachable for i. Basically, we add conﬁdence
as an additional selection criteria in our approach.
P
mij ∗ mjs
msi =

mij ≥th & cij ≥th

P

(3.14)

mij

mij ≥th & cij ≥th

We compare our approach to TidalTrust and MoleTrust. As the Twitter data
set is more sparse than the Epinions.com data set, here we only try our approach
on the Epinions.com data set. Also, for space limitation, we only do experiment for
two hops cases. Figure 3.4 shows us that by using conﬁdence as an additional factor,
predicted results are more accurate. Especially, in the area of high conﬁdence, which
is the reliable area for decision making in many applications, our approach performs
better than TidalTrust and MoleTrust. Here, x axis is the value for diﬀerent th.
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Figure 3.4. Prediction comparison among TidalTrust, MoleTrust and
our approach on the Epinions.com data set (two hops)
There are some existing works which also consider conﬁdence, such as [72], [112]
and [26]. Similar to [72], the deﬁnition of conﬁdence in our framework also captures
two important intuitions or properties mentioned in [72]. However, we think that
our deﬁnition of conﬁdence is computationally cheaper than [72] and [112]. In [72],
authors use a binary search algorithm to convert between evidence space and trust
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space, as there is no closd-form solution for it. In our approach, we derive conﬁdence
from the error in the measurement theory, which is simpler than [72] and [112].
More important, for diﬀerent types of transitivity (i.e. discounting) and aggregation
formulas, it is easy to calculate the propagated error by following the error propagation
theory [162].

3.7 Coverage
As we stated earlier, one of the main purposes of inferring indirect trust is to allow
more pairs of users to be connected given the original sparsely connected networks.
This is especially useful for many applications, such as recommender systems, in
which many users have only a limited number of direct contacts. We use the term
coverage to measure how many pairs of users are connected within a speciﬁc number
of hops.

3.7.1 Coverage vs. Number of Hops
It is obvious that more pairs of users can be connected if we predict indirect trust
for a larger number of hops. In this section, we quantitatively show how the number
of hops can aﬀect the coverage. Due to time limitation, we only calculate the coverage
within one hop (directly connected users), two hops, and three hops. Table 3.4 shows
the coverage results of two data sets. Note that, the coverage within two hops also
contains pairs of users within one hop, and the same rule applies to three hops.
Table 3.4.
The coverage in two data sets
Triads

connected pairs in the Epinions.com

connected pairs in the Twitter

one hop (direct)

1,530,103

6,829,998

two hops

152,795,175

65,131,606

three hops

977,171,805

833,540,419
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We can see that in the Twitter data set, the coverage within two hops only increases by less than 10 times compared with the coverage within one hop. It increases
120 times when we extend it to three hops. In the Epinions.com data set, when we
increase the length of the chains to three hops, the coverage increases more than
630 times compared with the one hop case. This diﬀerence is caused by the diﬀerent topologies of the two online social communities. We measure the density of two
communities by

|E |
|V |(|V |−1)

[187]. Here |E| is the number of edges, and |V | is the num-

ber of nodes in communities. We can see that the Epinions.com data set (density is
2.4851 ∗ 10−4 ) is much denser than the Twitter data set (density is 6.8967 ∗ 10−8 ).
Apart from this, in the Twitter data set, there are 4, 447 connected sub-communities
or sub-graphs (composed by inter-connected nodes using trust relationships), and
most sub-communities only contain 2 or 3 users. Although its average size is 464.87,
among 2, 067, 284 users, 2, 018, 469 of them are leaf nodes in the Twitter data set.
This is because we include the users to whom StockTwits’s followers posted interactive
tweets; however these users’ tweets are not collected as they are not part of the stock
group. After removing the leaf nodes, its average size becomes 10.98. In other words,
the Twitter data set is very sparsely connected; however, in the Epinions.com data
set, we ﬁnd 390 sub-communities with their average size equal to 201.19 (it does not
contain leaf nodes), where the sub-communities’ average size is much larger than in
the Twitter data set (after removing the leaf nodes). Details about sub-communities
statistics in two data sets can be found in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5.
Sub-communities’ statistics of two data sets
Community

Maximum

Minimum

Average

community

community

community

Average community
Number of

Number of

size without
leaf nods

communities

leaf nodes

size

size

size

Epinions.com

390

77,540

2

201.20

0

201.20

Twitter

4,447

2,055,406

2

464.87

2,018,469

10.98
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In conclusion, coverage is aﬀected not only by the length of the chains, but also by
the networks topologies. Within densely connected networks, inferring indirect trust
can help to cover more pairs of users than in sparsely connected networks.

3.7.2 Coverage vs. Accuracy
By increasing the length of the chains, more users become connected; however,
on the other hand, it may sacriﬁce prediction accuracy. To see how the length of
the chains can aﬀect the prediction accuracy, we do leave-one-out experiments on
two data sets for three hops cases, in which each triad contains exactly three hops.
In other words, user A and user Z are only connected by paths which contain two
intermediate users.
Table 3.6.
Formulas’ performances on the Epinions.com data set (three hops)
MAE

RMSE

MAE

RMSE

MAE

RMSE

(diﬀm)

(diﬀm)

(diﬀc)

(diﬀc)

(Man)

(Man)

TP1,AP1

0.0840

0.1089

0.1322

0.1441

0.2162

0.1806

TP1,AP2

0.1016

0.1465

0.0328

0.0622

0.1344

0.1591

TP1,AP3

0.0642

0.1322

0.1400

0.1510

0.2043

0.2007

TP1,AP4

0.0566

0.1158

0.0768

0.0848

0.1334

0.1435

TP1,AP5

0.5775

0.6104

0.0428

0.0701

0.6203

0.6144

TP2,AP1

0.0841

0.1094

0.1324

0.1442

0.2165

0.1810

TP2,AP2

0.1014

0.1463

0.0.0332

0.0621

0.1346

0.1589

TP2,AP3

0.0643

0.1314

0.1404

0.1515

0.2047

0.2005

TP2,AP4

0.0564

0.1163

0.0773

0.0857

0.1337

0.1444

TP2,AP5

0.5748

0.6069

0.0464

0.0734

0.6212

0.6113

TP3,AP1

0.0724

0.0954

0.1342

0.1461

0.2066

0.1475

TP3,AP2

0.0865

0.1274

0.0554

0.0786

0.1419

0.1497

Formulas

TP3,AP3

0.0642

0.1316

0.1402

0.1513

0.2045

0.2005

TP3,AP4

0.0567

0.1158

0.0268

0.0637

0.0835

0.1322

TP3,AP5

0.0847

0.1513

0.0260

0.0632

0.1107

0.1640

Now, we increase the length of the chains to three hops. Table 3.6 and Table 3.7
show the formulas’ performances on two data sets separately. For time eﬃciency, we
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randomly select 10, 000 three hops triads (repeated 10 times) from the Epinions.com
data set. From these two tables, we can see that formulas follow the same performance
patterns in three hops triads as they do in two hops triads. But obviously, their
prediction accuracy is not as good as in two hops triads.
Table 3.7.
Formulas’ performances on the Twitter data set (three hops)
MAE

RMSE

MAE

RMSE

MAE

RMSE

(diﬀm)

(diﬀm)

(diﬀc)

(diﬀc)

(Man)

(Man)

TP1,AP1

0.3656

0.3921

0.2734

0.3347

0.6390

0.5155

TP1,AP2

0.3671

0.3941

0.2522

0.3131

0.6193

0.5033

TP1,AP3

0.3292

0.3785

0.2415

0.3004

0.5707

0.4832

TP1,AP4

0.2922

0.3296

0.2026

0.2521

0.4948

0.4149

TP1,AP5

0.4010

0.4273

0.2667

0.3271

0.6677

0.5382

TP2,AP1

0.2547

0.2869

0.2962

0.3575

0.5510

0.4584

TP2,AP2

0.2555

0.2876

0.2826

0.3450

0.5381

0.4491

TP2,AP3

0.3357

0.3881

0.2930

0.3543

0.6287

0.5255

TP2,AP4

0.2174

0.2541

0.2324

0.2901

0.4498

0.3856

TP2,AP5

0.2587

0.2911

0.3082

0.3688

0.5669

0.4698

TP3,AP1

0.1440

0.1843

0.2367

0.2981

0.3806

0.3505

TP3,AP2

0.1465

0.1883

0.2177

0.2764

0.3642

0.3345

TP3,AP3

0.3550

0.4098

0.2692

0.3332

0.6242

0.5282

TP3,AP4

0.1319

0.1765

0.2143

0.2746

0.3462

0.3265

TP3,AP5

0.1467

0.1930

0.2508

0.3167

0.3976

0.3709

Formulas

3.7.3 Coverage vs. Conﬁdence
In this section, we explore the relationship between the coverage and conﬁdence.
As the Epinions.com data set is denser than the Twitter data set, we only do experiment on the Epinions.com data set, which contains 158, 143 users. Among them,
there are 158, 143 ∗ 158, 143 = 25, 009, 208, 449 possible pairs of users.
The relationship between the coverage and conﬁdence is shown in Figure 3.5. Note
that the y axis is in logarithmic, and the x axis denotes the desired inferred conﬁdence. For example, if we have x = 0.5, only those triads whose inferred conﬁdence

79
One hop coverage
Two hops only coverage
Within two hops coverage
Three hops only coverage
Within three hops coverage

10

10

9

Coverage

10

8

10

7

10

6

10

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4
0.5
Confidence

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

Figure 3.5. Relation between desired conﬁdence levels and the coverage

is greater than or equal to 0.5 will be counted. Overall, we can see that when requiring higher conﬁdence levels, less pairs of users can be connected. Our results show
that the two hops only cases (does not include one hop) coverage is two magnitudes
higher than the one hop cases coverage. The coverage of the three hops only cases
is one more magnitude higher than the two hops only cases coverage. Such results
could be used by various applications in online social communities to explore tradeoﬀs between the coverage and corresponding levels of conﬁdence. For example, we
could increase the number of receivers of a given recommendation depending on the
desired level of conﬁdence, from which we will determine the chances of success of
that recommendation.

3.8 Chapter Summary
We developed a measurement theory-based trust management framework that
aims to provide an intuitive way to represent and manage cognitive trust. For cognitive trust, we introduced two trust metrics: trustworthiness/impression and conﬁdence. On one hand, these metrics are intuitive and on the other hand, they are
similar to measured value and the error used in measurement theory. Using the cog-
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nitive trust concept, we established trust networks among users in two real online
social communities.
Based on the proposed trust management framework, we adapted some widely
used transitivity and aggregation formulas to our scheme. Our framework associated
with these formulas can be used to infer indirect trust relationships among unconnected users in sparsely connected networks. We showed with experiments on two
real online social communities data sets the validity of our framework, as well as its
enormous potential usage in various social network applications. Our results showed
coherence with [2], that no single formula can guarantee very good performances in
all applications, as users in diﬀerent communities and applications have diﬀerent behavior patterns. Our framework is signiﬁcantly important because it serves as an
underlying fundamental for other schemes which focus on speciﬁc formulas. Also, we
showed that by using conﬁdence as additional information, our approach can perform
better than two existing works.
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4 USING TWITTER TRUST NETWORK FOR STOCK MARKET DATA
ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
Online social media (e.g. Twitter) is becoming more popular, as it is easier for
users to post and spread information than with traditional media. With more users
joining in online social networks, more data is available. Therefore, many datadriven applications, such as disaster detection [177], election predictions [179, 188],
information ﬁltering [189], opinion mining [190–192] and so on beneﬁt from this trend.
Among them, ﬁnancial market analysis is one of the most attractive ﬁelds and has
attracted a lot of attention [79, 178, 193–195].
The stock market is a very hot topic in the ﬁeld of ﬁnance and economics. Many
researchers try to analyze and predict stock returns based on various types of theories
[196, 197]. For example, Chartist theory [198] assumes that the stock market’s past
behavior patterns will recur in the future. Thus we can predict future stock returns
by using historical data. In contrast to Chartist theory, Random Walk theory [199]
considers stock returns as identical independent variables. Although these theories’
assumptions are diﬀerent, many existing works use historical stock market data, such
as open price, close price, daily trade volume and so on, to predict future stock
returns.
Besides historical stock market performance, investors’ decisions can be aﬀected
by news [200] and media [193, 194, 201–203]. Also, public mood or sentiment which
is reﬂected in media plays an important role in investors’ decision making processes
[204, 205]. Investors’ decisions in turn can aﬀect stock market. Therefore, stock
market is related with public mood in news or media.
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With the popularity of Twitter and its easy-to-use open Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs), there exist many works that use Twitter as a platform to analyze
and predict stock market activities, including both indicator-level and ﬁrm-level analysis [79, 178, 195, 206, 207]. In addition to academic researchers, ﬁrms are also paying
attention to Twitter for their commercial purposes. Many ﬁrms use Twitter to interact with their investors and customers [208]. Compared with traditional media,
Twitter is eﬃcient. To use Twitter to analyze stock market, typically Twitter feeds
(tweets) are ﬁrst analyzed by sentiment analysis tools to extract their sentiment, then
tweet sentiments are aggregated together. Aggregated Twitter sentiment valence is
then used for ﬁnancial market analysis. Most widely used sentiment analysis tools
generate binary results (positive or bullish vs. negative or bearish), although some
sentiment analysis tools can generate more complicated results, such as multi-level
sentiment results.
The main hypothesis of this work is that the users’ reputation, built by the inter trust among them, using our trust management system, helps in making better
decisions of the stock market investors. To verify this hypothesis and to validate
our trust management system, we collect stock market-related data from Twitter to
see the correlation between Twitter sentiment valence and abnormal stock returns.
Therefore, the correlation between Twitter sentiment valence, ﬁltered by our trust
management system, and abnormal stock returns served as ground truth for our trust
management system. We select eight ﬁrms which are the top eight mentioned ﬁrms
(which have the largest number of tweets) in our data set. The reason we select these
eight ﬁrms is that, for other ﬁrms, the average number of daily tweets is low. Based
on only a small number of tweets, we think that the analysis result is not reliable.
For the selected eight ﬁrms we collect their stock market data correspondingly from
Yahoo! Finance. As indicated in [209], the source (users) of tweets is also an important factor. Therefore, unlike many existing works which treat all the authors equally
important or ignore authors’ identities, in addition to analyzing tweets’ sentiment, we
also take into account tweets’ authors. We adapt our measurement theory based trust
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management framework [210] and construct a user-to-user trust network for Twitter
users based on their tweeting behaviors. Then, users are diﬀerentiated by their reputation or power in the whole community, where reputation or power is determined by
the user-to-user trust network. Furthermore, to aggregate tweets together for Twitter
sentiment valence, each tweet is weighted by its author’s power.
To compare our approach to other ones, we use the Pearson correlation tests
among results for eight months time (the trading days from 01/01/2015 through
08/31/2015). Compared to treating all the authors equally important or weighting
them by their number of followers, our trust network based reputation mechanism
ampliﬁes the correlation between a speciﬁc ﬁrm’s Twitter sentiment valence and the
ﬁrm’s stock abnormal returns. To further consider the possible auto-correlation property of abnormal stock returns and to test the relation between Twitter sentiment
valence and abnormal stock returns, we construct a linear regression model, which
includes historical stock abnormal returns. Again, our results show that by using
our trust network power based method to weight tweets, Twitter sentiment valence
reﬂects abnormal stock returns better than other two methods, that is treating all
the authors equally important or weighting authors by their number of followers.
The remaining portion of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.2, we
introduce some background knowledge and literature works in this ﬁeld. In Section
4.3, we introduce our trust management framework and adapt it to Twitter. Also,
we propose a simple method to calculate for users’ power or reputation. In Section
4.4, we illustrate how we aggregate Twitter sentiment valence for the ﬁrms. And we
propose our trust network power based method as well as other two baseline methods.
In Section 4.5, we give detailed information about the data sets we used in this work.
Also, we compare our trust network power based method with other two baseline
methods regarding Pearson correlation coeﬃcients and a linear regression model. In
Section 4.6, we conclude this chapter and list several limitations of applicability of
this work as well as some potential future work.
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4.2 Background and Related Works
Twitter, as one of the most popular online social media platforms, provides its
users the ability to share and spread their opinions. It also enables users who have
the same interests to form groups. The stock market is among one of the hottest
topics among Twitter users. There are many stock market-related groups or gurus
on Twitter, such as StockTwits, FinancialTimes, MarketWatch, and so on. Recent
research has shown that investors are likely to post ﬁnancial news or articles and share
their opinions on Twitter [211]. Compared with traditional media, Twitter feeds can
be incorporated instantly into stock prices. Therefore, Twitter has become a widely
used platform for researchers to analyze and predict stock returns.
As [193, 201, 202] pointed out, investors’ emotions or sentiments can be reﬂected
by the stock market. Negative sentiment or pessimism on social media might induce a
stock price to drop. Positive sentiment is more likely to induce stock prices to increase
than neutral or pessimism sentiment. Therefore, given users’ text (tweets), natural
language processing methods are needed to analyze investors’ emotions. There exist
many sentiment analysis tools. Roughly, they can be divided into two categories: word
count analysis strategy and machine learning based strategy. Word count analysis
strategy uses dictionaries to determine sentiment for each word and then aggregate
words’ sentiment together. Most commonly used dictionaries in this ﬁeld include
Harvard-IV dictionary [212] and Loughran and McDonald’s ﬁnancial dictionary [213].
Among machine learning methods, most of them are classiﬁers, such as Naive Bayes
classiﬁer, SVM classiﬁer, and so on. One of the problems of the machine learning
based strategy is that it requires a set of labeled training data, which might need a
huge load of manual work. In this work, we use an existing sentiment analysis tool –
SentiStrength [185], which is designed for short informal text.
Twitter sentiment valence is then measured based on the detected positive and
negative tweets. Various Twitter sentiment valence measurements are used in the
literature [193, 195, 211, 214]. In principle, Twitter sentiment valence measures the
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ratio of positive tweets to negative tweets. To investigate the linear relation between
Twitter sentiment valence and stock prices or stock returns, Pearson correlation coeﬃcients [79, 211, 215] and beta coeﬃcients of linear regression models [178, 195, 214]
are widely used in the literature.
Existing works in this ﬁeld can be divided into two categories based on their
focus. Indicator-level works mainly focus on indicators, such as Dow Jones Industrial
Average Index, NASDAQ, S&P 500 index, and so on. This type of work focuses on
the whole industry. Indicator-level works include [178], [193], [216], [217], and so on.
More recently, researchers are also paying much attention to ﬁrm-level works; as the
name itself indicates, instead of investigating the whole industry, this type of work
focuses on speciﬁc ﬁrms. [215], [195], [214], [211], [218] and [219] belong to ﬁrm-level
works. In this chapter, we focus on speciﬁc ﬁrms.
Bollen et al., used OpinionFinder and Google-Proﬁle of Mood States (GPOMS)
to measure sentiment for tweets [178]. Rather than outputting binary sentiment results (OpinionFinder), GPOMS measures sentiment in six dimensions, which includes
calm, alert, sure, vital, kind, and happy. And it showed that only calm is related to
Dow Jones Industrial Average Index. Tetlock [193] did experiments with Wall Street
Journal, and mainly focused on the pessimism score of the media. It showed that
high media pessimism scores caused the drop in stock market prices. In [217], authors classiﬁed tweets into fear, worry, and hope based on the corresponding words.
It showed that Twitter sentiment (fear, worry, and hope) is negatively correlated with
Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, NASDAQ and S&P 500 index. Similarly, [216]
measured anxiety, worry, and fear in LiveJournal, and it turned out that they were
negatively related to the S&P 500 index.
Smailovic et al., [214] calculated positive sentiment probabilities by dividing the
number of positive tweets by the total number of tweets. It then analyzed eight ﬁrms’
stock returns and their positive sentiment probabilities by using the Granger causality test [220]. Instead of focusing on stock returns, Ranco et al., [215] measured the
Pearson correlation coeﬃcient between 30 ﬁrms’ abnormal returns and their Twitter
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sentiment valence. Its focus was on event detection and events’ relation with abnormal returns. Similarly, Sul et al., [195] measured the relation between Twitter
sentiment valence and abnormal returns via analyzing beta coeﬃcients of linear regression models. In [211], besides investigating the relation among Twitter sentiment
valence, stock returns, message volume and trading volume, Sprenger et al., showed
that tweets from users who always provide good advice are more likely to be retweeted
more than other users.
However, none of those mentioned above works took into account tweets’ authors.
Even in [211], it only investigated the relation between the advice quality and the
number of retweets. It did not diﬀerentiate their authors. In the remainder of this
chapter, given historical Twitter data, we adapt our trust management framework
[210] to measure user-to-user trust relationships and then construct a trust network
for the whole community. Based on the trust network within the community, we
then derive users’ reputation or power, which is used later as weights in the process
of Twitter sentiment aggregation. Through weighting each tweet by its author’s
reputation or power, we can amplify the correlation between speciﬁc ﬁrms’ Twitter
sentiment valence and their abnormal stock returns. Also, we show that to get reliable
analysis, a suﬃcient number of tweets must be available.

4.3 Trust Network for Twitter
Trust, which is a subjective concept, plays an extremely important role in people’s
daily lives. Actually, we use our trust estimations or trust networks to make decisions
in our lives [9, 154]. For example, among several service providers, we might choose
the one who has the highest rating. On Twitter, given a huge number of subscribers,
trust is very important for users to diﬀerentiate among other users. A user might
have thousands of followers or friends on Twitter; however, not all of them are acquaintances. Huberman et al., [8] diﬀerentiated “claimed friends” from “real friends”
on Twitter by counting the number of interactive tweets that two users post towards
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each other. To handle trust on large online social media sites, such as Facebook and
Twitter, we need support from computer systems. Therefore, we have to represent
trust computationally, which we call trust modeling in this work. A lot of research
has been done in this ﬁeld [111, 121, 157].
Typically, only very few users are directly connected through trust network on
Twitter [22]. Therefore, besides representing trust in a computational way, we also
need a framework that can eﬀectively infer Friend of a Friend (FOAF) relationships,
as user-to-user direct trust relationships are not suﬃcient in sparsely connected online
social networks. In this work, we call this trust inference. In [210], we proposed a
measurement theory based trust management framework which addresses both trust
modeling and trust inference. We represent our trust management framework in
Figure 1.1.

4.3.1 Trust Components and Trust Modeling for Twitter
Our trust management framework is based on measurement theory. As we do in
Section 3.6.2, we treat each interactive tweet as a measurement that the truster has
towards the trustee. By treating interactive tweets as measurements, we can calculate
trustworthiness m by following Equation 4.1. Instead of just averaging all the tweets,
we divide them into diﬀerent time windows based on their posted date. We cluster
tweets posted within the same month into the same window. And we treat these
windows diﬀerently. In each window, we group tweets based on their posted dates.
On each day, we treat them equally and calculate the mean impression md for that
speciﬁc day by following Equation 4.1, as well as cd .
Pi=N
md =

i=1

N

mi

sP
and

cd = 1 − 2 ∗ rd

where

rd =

i=N
i=1 (mi

− m)2 scale2
+
N ∗ (N − 1)
12
(4.1)

After calculating md and cd for each day, we use the weighted mean to combine
the results for each month (time window) in Equation 3.10. Here we use wi =

1
2 ,
rdi
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to assign higher weights to those who have higher conﬁdence. Correspondingly, the
error of the weighted mean is expressed in Equation 3.11.
Similar to [40], we assume that trustworthiness can fade with time. We use forgetting factor σ, where σ is less than 1, to capture this eﬀect on the truster’s conﬁdence.
As we are going to use tweets posted from 01/01/2015 through 08/31/2015 to analyze
stock market, we use tweets which were posted in the year of 2014 (before the stock
market analysis period) to construct the trust network. Therefore, we have 12 time
windows in total. The conﬁdence of December, which is the most recent month, is
not discounted. The conﬁdence of November is discounted by σ, and the conﬁdence
of October is discounted by σ 2 , and so on. We show this eﬀect of forgetting factor
in Equation 3.12, where i is the number of the corresponding month (i.e. i = 1 for
January).
Similar to Equations 3.10 and 3.11, we combine 12 time windows’ results using
0

the weighted mean where weights are conﬁdence c . In this chapter, we select one
month as the length of the time window and the forgetting factor σ = 0.95. Further
reﬁnement of these parameters will be part of our future work.

4.3.2 Trust Inference
In this chapter, we use the same 15 combinations of transitivity and aggregation
formulas as in Section 3.5. These are all commonly used formulas in literature, and
each formula has its meaning. For the meanings and sources of these formulas, please
refer to [210].
As we indicated in [210], the user-to-user Twitter trust network typically is sparsely
connected. We use the mentioned 15 combinations of formulas, to infer indirect trust
relationships. We call the number of links from the truster to the trustee hops. For
example, if A knows Z through B, in this case, we say that it has two hops. On the
one hand, by increasing the number of hops, we can have more pairs of users being
connected. On the other hand, the larger number of hops, the lower is the accuracy
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of the inferred indirect trust [4]. For the trade-oﬀ between them, in this chapter, we
only infer indirect trust by two hops.

4.3.3 Users’ Power/Reputation
Based on the built user-to-user trust network on Twitter, we can calculate users’
power or reputation. If a user is trusted by a large number of other users, she/he will
have a high inﬂuence in the whole community. In other words, in order for a user to
have a higher power or reputation, ﬁrst of all, she/he needs to have a large number
of friends or incoming trust links. For example, she/he is a celebrity and followed by
a larger number of people on Twitter. Besides this, those incoming trust links have
to be trustworthy. Remember that we represent trustworthiness in the range of [0, 1],
and 0.5 represents neutral sentiment. In other words, most of the positive incoming
trust links’ trustworthiness should be larger than or equal to 0.5. Also, we want these
incoming trust links to be conﬁdent as well as trustworthy. To consider the number
of incoming trust links, their trustworthiness and conﬁdence together, in this work,
we deﬁne a simple method to calculate power for users as in Equation 4.2.
Pu =

X

mui ∗ cui

(4.2)

ui∈INu & mui ≥0.5

Here, INu is the set of users who have trust links toward user u. In other words,
IN contains all the users that have trust assessments towards user u. Considering
trustworthiness and conﬁdence together, we use the product of them (m ∗ c). In
such a way, even given the same trustworthiness m, higher conﬁdent incoming trust
links contribute more to users’ power than lower conﬁdent trust links. By setting a
threshold of 0.5 for trustworthiness, we only count trustworthy incoming trust links.
For negative or neutral links, we do not want them to contribute to the power.
Note that, in this work, we use a very simple deﬁnition for users’ power since
the main purpose of this work is to show that trust network power based method is
able to improve stock market analysis, but not to construct a complicated model to
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predict abnormal returns. Exploring more complicated reputation algorithms, such
as PageRank [221] and Peertrust [69], will be part of our future work.

4.4 Twitter Sentiment Valence
4.4.1 Sentiment Analysis for Tweets
As many existing works [79, 178, 195, 204, 206, 207, 211, 214, 215] suggested, social
media’s emotional valence can be a helpful and important factor for stock market
analysis. Given a tweet, its sentiment can be analyzed in two dimensions: valence or
polarity and arousal [195, 222]. As did many existing works, in this work we only use
tweets’ sentiment valence. In other words, for each tweet, we only analyze whether it
is positive or negative. In some works in the ﬁeld of stock market analysis, positive is
also called bullish and negative is called bearish [202]. In this work, we use the terms
of positive and negative.
In literature, there are two types of sentiment analysis tools: word count analysis
strategy based tools and machine learning strategy based tools. For simplicity, many
works use word count analysis strategy [178,195]. In this category, based on the given
positive and negative dictionaries, each word is mapped into the positive, neutral, or
negative tag. To aggregate sentiment valence, there exists two methods: documentlevel method or tweet-level method. In the document-level works, the numbers of
positive, neutral and negative words are counted together for all the interesting tweets
in the document. While in the tweet-level works, each tweet is ﬁrst tagged as positive
or negative, based on the number of positive and negative words that it contains.
Then, sentiment tagged tweets are accumulated for document-level sentiment valence.
In machine learning strategy based tools, words are ﬁrst used to construct features,
i.e., TF-IDF [223], which can be later used along with other features by classiﬁers
[215, 224].
In this work, we use an existing sentiment analysis tool – SentiStrength [185]
which was also used by [224], to do tweet-level sentiment analysis for each tweet.

91
SentiStrength has shown its good performance for informal short text [225]; however,
it is not specially designed for ﬁnancial text analysis. Therefore, in addition to its
default lexicon, we also add Loughran and McDonald’s ﬁnancial dictionary [213],
which is widely used for ﬁnancial text sentiment analysis, into SentiStrength.
Note that SentiStrength has diﬀerent types of output results. In the previous trust
modeling phase, we used SentiStrength’s multi-scales output results, which can provide more grained information about users’ attitudes. While in the ﬁeld of analyzing
Twitter sentiment and stock market, only binary output results (positive or bullish
vs. negative or bearish) are used [178, 195, 202, 211, 215, 224]. Following this, we use
SentiStrength’s binary output results in the stage of stock market analysis.

4.4.2 Aggregation of Twitter Sentiment Valence
By using SentiStrength, we analyze sentiment for each tweet. To investigate the
relation between the Twitter sentiment valence and stock returns, we need to accumulate tweets’ sentiment valence on a daily basis. To aggregate daily sentiment
valence, there are three widely used variables in literature [195, 218]. Following [211],
in this work, we select to use the log of the ratio of the number of positive tweets
to the number of negative tweets, which is shown in Equation 4.3. Here, P is the
number of daily positive tweets, and N is the number of daily negative tweets.
T SV = log(

1+P
)
1+N

(4.3)

Among existing works, all tweets are considered equally important regardless of
their authors. Each tweet contributes to either the number of positive tweets or to the
number of negative tweets in Equation 4.3. However, in reality, the source of information is also very important [209]. In the case of stock market analysis, we assume
that users who have a higher power in the community should have more inﬂuence
than users with lower power. Therefore, we adjust Equation 4.3 by incorporating
users’ power, which is calculated in Section 4.3.3, into calculating Twitter sentiment
valence. Instead of considering all tweets equally important, we weight tweets by
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their authors’ power as in Equation 4.4. Here, P S is the set of positive tweets, and
N S is the set of negative tweets. up and un are the authors who post positive and
negative tweets correspondingly.
P
1 + p∈P S P ower(up | up posts p)
P
T SV = log(
)
1 + n∈N S P ower(un | un posts n)

(4.4)

Note that, it is possible that a single user appears two or more times in Equation
4.4. For example, a user might post two positive tweets about a speciﬁc ﬁrm on the
same day. Or she/he can even post one positive tweet and one negative tweet about
the same ﬁrm on the same day. In such cases, this user appears multiple times in
Equation 4.4.
To compare with existing works, we introduce two baseline methods to calculate
Twitter sentiment valence. In the ﬁrst one, authors’ information is ignored such that
all the tweets are considered equally important as in Equation 4.3. We use T SVequal
to denote this method. Actually, T SVequal is widely used by many existing works,
including [195], [211], [214], [215] and [218]. In the second method, instead of using
users’ power as weights in Equation 4.4, we use the number of followers that the users
have as weights. This is a straightforward way to diﬀerentiate users’ inﬂuence, as the
number of followers that a user has is directly available on Twitter. We denote this
method as T SVf ollowers , and show it in Equation 4.5. Correspondingly, we denote our
trust network power based method (Equation 4.4) as T SVpower .
P
1 + p∈P S N umberof f ollowers(up | up posts p)
P
T SV = log(
)
1 + n∈N S N umberof f ollowers(un | un posts n)

(4.5)

4.5 Results
4.5.1 Data Sets
To investigate the relationship between Twitter sentiment valence and stock returns, we collected two sets of data: ﬁnancial data set and Twitter data set.
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Financial Data
To have suﬃcient information for ﬁrms that we are going to investigate, we select
eight ﬁrms that have the largest number of tweets in our Twitter data set. On
average, each ﬁrm have more than 40 daily tweets. Also, these eight ﬁrms are selected
from the S&P 500 index. They are Apple Inc (AAPL), Amazon.com Inc (AMZN),
Alphabet Inc Class C (GOOG), Facebook Inc (FB), Netﬂix Inc (NFLX), Gilead
Sciences Inc (GILD), General Electric Corp (GE), and Microsoft Corp (MSFT). For
the period that we are interested, we download their daily stock market data from
Yahoo!Finance, which include open price, highest price, lowest price, close price,
adjusted the close price and trading volume. We analyze Twitter and stock market
information from 01/01/2015 through 08/31/2015, which include 167 trading days in
total.
Like many other works [178, 195, 215] did, we focus on stock returns, which is deﬁned in Equation 4.6. Here, we use the adjusted close price in Equation 4.6. Therefore, stock returns reﬂect stock price’s change compared with the previous trading
day.
Rd =

P riced − P riced−1
P riced−1

(4.6)

In the ﬁeld of ﬁnance, people are more interested in abnormal returns than stock
returns [215]. Abnormal returns are deﬁned as the actual stock returns minus the
expected stock returns (also called normal returns) [215, 226], as shown in Equation
4.7. Here, we use E[Rd ] to denote the expected returns or normal returns. From this
deﬁnition, we can see that abnormal returns somehow reﬂect external events or news’
inﬂuence on the stock portfolios. In other words, abnormal returns are more sensitive
to external events and news than stock market price itself.
ARd = Rd − E[Rd ]

(4.7)

In literature, there are many alternative methods and models used to calculate
the expected stock returns [227]. To evaluate the diﬀerence and performance of these
models is beyond the scope of our work. As in [215], we use the market model to
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estimate the expected returns. It assumes that a ﬁrm’s stock returns have a linear
relation with the whole industry’s stock returns. We use a linear regression model
to represent it and show it in Equation 4.8. In our case, we use the S&P 500 index
as the independent variable RSP . In Equation 4.8, α is the intercept, and β is the
linear coeﬃcient. As in [215] and [228], we use the previous 120 days as the training
set to estimate α and β. α and β are estimated following the ordinary least squares
(OLS) procedure. Therefore, although we only investigated from 01/01/2015 through
08/31/2015, we also collected part of 2014’s stock data to calculate the expected
returns.
E[Rd ] = α + β ∗ RSPd

(4.8)

Twitter Data
To collect stock market-related tweets, we ﬁnd three oﬃcial certiﬁcated accounts
on Twitter. They are StockTwits, FinancialTimes, and MarketWatch. All of them are
stock market-related companies or organizations. We consider them as three groups,
and their followers discuss stock market within the groups. We also collect all the
followers of these three groups and combine them into a single group or community.
Note that, compared with Chapter 3, we have a larger data set in this chapter, which
is composed of three stock market related groups.
We develop an application using Twitter ’s open API as well as twitter4J library
to collect data from Twitter. We ﬁrst retrieve users’ IDs and then use these user IDs
to retrieve their tweets, which are written in English. Note that Twitter’s open API
limits data are collecting up to 3, 200 tweets from a single user’s timeline. The dataset
consists of users’ screen names, locations, tweets, and the date and time when they
posted the tweets. We take a snapshot of the group in September 2015. At that time,
it had 2, 898, 756 users in total. And from users’ timelines, we collect all the tweets
posted before September 2015, for a total number of 775, 928, 121 tweets. In addition
to their oﬃcial accounts’ followers, we also include users towards whom the followers

95
had posted interactive tweets. To build the trust network among users, we use all the
collected interactive tweets. Based on our deﬁnition of trust, there are 20, 916, 112
pairs of users having trust relationships. And based on the deﬁnition of users’ power,
3, 929, 933 users have their power calculated. So, we only consider tweets that were
posted by these 3, 929, 933 users in the later stock market analysis stage.
After building the trust network, we ﬁlter out tweets that are not related to
the stock market in the stage of stock market analysis. Similar to many other works
[178,195,206,215], we use the dollar sign (e.g. $AAPL), to select stock market related
tweets, since the dollar sign is commonly used on Twitter to tag stock market related
tweets. For the eight ﬁrms that we have selected above, we collect their daily tweets
from 01/01/2015 through 08/31/2015. All the tweets are grouped on a daily basis for
each ﬁrm. We list the number of tweets on trading days for each ﬁrm in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1.
Number of tweets on trading days from January 1st 2015 through August 31st 2015
Firm

Total number

Average number

Maximum number

Minimum number

of tweets

of daily tweets

of daily tweets

of daily tweets

AAPL

61,807

370.1018

2,653

101

FB

24,047

143.9940

1,089

37

GOOG

19,461

116.5329

704

29

NFLX

15,964

95.5928

665

13

AMZN

13,943

83.4910

912

14

GE

9,091

54.4371

491

10

MSFT

8,087

48.4251

567

9

GILD

7,329

43.8862

483

4

4.5.2 Trust Inference Validation Experiment
To infer indirect trust relations among users on Twitter, we collect three transitive
formulas and ﬁve aggregation formulas from literature in Section 3.5, which results
in 15 possible combinations. Each of them might ﬁt well for speciﬁc applications.
As [2] and [210] indicated, in diﬀerent applications, users might exhibit diﬀerent
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trust propagation behavior patterns. Therefore, among 15 combinations, we need to
select a combination that works for our Twitter application. To measure their trust
inference accuracy, we use the leave-one-out cross-validation method [229]. Basically,
in the leave-one-out cross-validation method, we compare the diﬀerence between the
actual trust expressed by the truster and the inferred trust calculated by combinations
of transitive formulas and aggregation formulas. For each leave-one-out case, we ﬁrst
hide the actual direct trust link (dash line in Figure 3.2) from the truster towards
the trustee and use all the remaining direct trust links (solid line in Figure 3.2) to
infer indirect trust by trust transitivity and trust aggregation formulas. An example
of leave-one-out case is shown in Figure 3.2, where there exists N indirect paths from
truster A to trustee Z through B1 , B2 , ... BN . In our dataset, we have 499, 327
leave-one-out cases.
As we did before, for AP 2, we use conﬁdence as weights, w = c. Accuracy is
measured by classical mean absolute error (MAE). We use dif f m to represent the
absolute diﬀerence between the inferred m and actual m, and use dif f c to represent
the absolute diﬀerence between the inferred c and actual c accordingly. Additionally, to consider dif f m and dif f c together, we also measure MAE for Manhattan
distances, which is deﬁned in Equation 3.13.
As [4] pointed out, inferred indirect trust becomes unreliable when the length of
the chains (the number of hops) increases. Therefore, we only take into account the
chains containing two hops. We list the performance results of 15 combinations in
Table 4.2.
From Table 4.2, we can see that T P 1 and AP 3’s performance is signiﬁcantly worse
than other formulas, which is consistent with our previous work [210]. Although
many applications use multiplication (T P 1) as the transitivity formula [2, 4, 173], in
this application, it is not the best one. To consider trustworthiness m and conﬁdence
c together, we select to use the combination of T P 3AP 2 in the remainder of this
chapter, which has the smallest M AE(man) among 15 combinations. By selecting
T P 3, it means that we considered the minimum m in a trust path as the bottleneck.
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Table 4.2.
Comparison of formulas’ performances
Formulas

MAE(diﬀm)

MAE(diﬀc)

MAE(Man)

TP1,AP1

0.2449

0.0793

0.3242

TP1,AP2

0.2452

0.0795

0.3247

TP1,AP3

0.2237

0.0786

0.3023

TP1,AP4

0.2133

0.0816

0.2949

TP1,AP5

0.2520

0.0811

0.3331

TP2,AP1

0.0728

0.0946

0.1674

TP2,AP2

0.0728

0.0947

0.1676

TP2,AP3

0.2294

0.0961

0.3255

TP2,AP4

0.0730

0.0907

0.1636

TP2,AP5

0.0733

0.0977

0.1710

TP3,AP1

0.0780

0.0851

0.1631

TP3,AP2

0.0777

0.0850

0.1627

TP3,AP3

0.2252

0.0893

0.3145

TP3,AP4

0.0788

0.0919

0.1707

TP3,AP5

0.0797

0.0916

0.1713

To aggregate trust paths, we use the weighted mean method AP 2, where weights are
trust paths’ conﬁdence. In other words, we assume that higher conﬁdent trust paths
are more important than lower conﬁdent trust paths in aggregating trust paths.

4.5.3 Users’ Power Distribution
As stated above, in addition to the direct trust links, we also infer indirect trust
relations for users who originally are not directly connected by using T P 3AP 2 formulas. Given the trust network which includes both direct and indirect inferred trust
relations among users, we calculate users’ power/reputation by following our deﬁnition presented in Section 4.3.3. In Figure 4.1, we show the distribution of the number
of users for 100 bins of power. We normalize users’ power into the range of [0, 1]
using feature scaling. So each bin has a length of 0.01. Also, note that we use the
log scale for the number of users in each bin. From Figure 4.1, we can see that as in
many online communities, this distribution follows the power law distribution [230].
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Only a few users have high inﬂuence in the community. These powerful users can be
professional investors or gurus in the ﬁeld of stock market.

Figure 4.1. Distribution of the number of users with regard to users’ power

4.5.4 Pearson Correlation
Pearson correlation [231] is widely used to measure the linear relationship between two variables, including time series variables. In this work, we use Pearson
correlation coeﬃcients (PCC) to measure the linear relation between the abnormal
stock returns (AR) and Twitter sentiment valence (T SV ). Remember that from
01/01/2015 through 08/31/2015, we have 167 trading days. Therefore, AR and T SV
are two 167 ∗ 1 vectors. Given these two vectors, Pearson correlation coeﬃcients can
be calculated as shown in Equation 4.9, where E stands for the expectation value of
the variable.
E[AR ∗ T SV ] − E[AR] ∗ E[T SV ]
p
P CC = p
E[AR2 ] − E[AR]2 ∗ E[T SV 2 ] − E[T SV ]2

(4.9)

In Table 4.3, we list the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients between the selected eight
ﬁrms’ abnormal returns and their Twitter sentiment valence. In addition to Pearson
correlation coeﬃcients, we also test the p-values for them. We compare our trust
network power based method T SVpower with other two baseline methods T SVequal
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(a widely used method by many existing works, such as [195], [211], [214], [215]
and [218].) and T SVf ollowers that we mentioned in Section 4.4.
Table 4.3.
Comparison of Pearson correlation coeﬃcients for eight ﬁrms
Firms

T SVequal

T SVf ollowers

T SVpower

PCC

p-value

PCC

p-value

PCC

p-value

AAPL

0.3370

8.4 ∗ 10−6

0.3969

1.1 ∗ 10−7

0.4644

2.6 ∗ 10−10

FB

0.0662

0.395

0.0544

0.485

0.0962

0.216

GOOG

0.1830

0.018

0.1295

0.095

0.2883

1.6 ∗ 10−4

NFLX

0.1416

0.068

0.1758

0.023

0.4036

6.4 ∗ 10−8

0.5318

1.4 ∗ 10−13

1.3 ∗

10−7

AMZN

0.1314

0.091

0.3949

GE

0.0401

0.610

0.0043

0.956

0.1530

0.048

MSFT

0.0533

0.494

0.1035

0.183

0.3812

3.7 ∗ 10−7

GILD

0.0969

0.213

0.0305

0.696

0.1702

0.028

In Table 4.3, among T SVequal , T SVf ollowers and T SVpower we use bold font to
represent the most linearly correlated method with the stock abnormal returns. We
can see that our method T SVpower performs better than other two methods for all
eight ﬁrms. By weighting tweets’ sentiment by their authors’ power, T SVpower has
higher P CC (and correspondingly lower p-value) than other two methods. For many
ﬁrms, such as AMZN, GE, MSFT and GILD, by using T SVf ollowers or T SVequal , the
Pearson coeﬃcient between their Twitter sentiment valence and abnormal returns is
weak (p-values are greater than 0.05), which means that Twitter sentiment valence
might not have linear relation with abnormal stock returns. However, by using our
trust network power based method, Twitter sentiment valence is signiﬁcantly linearly
related to abnormal stock returns for all the ﬁrms except FB. This conﬁrms that
the source of information (tweets) is an important factor to consider in this ﬁeld of
study. Compared with T SVf ollowers , T SVpower not only takes the number of trust
links into account, but it also considers the quality of trust links. Our trust network
power based method highlights powerful users’ tweets and opinions, such that the
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accumulated Twitter sentiment valence is more linearly related to the ﬁrms’ abnormal
returns.

Figure 4.2. Comparison of three methods for NFLX
To illustrate this, we compare three methods’ of performance for NFLX’s abnormal
returns and its Twitter sentiment valence in Figure 4.2. We can see that our trust
network power based method reﬂects NFLX’s abnormal returns much better than
other two methods. For example, for the abnormal returns’ peak at day 13, our
method T SVpower follows the peak, while other two methods are not able to follow.
Note that, in Figure 4.2, in order to compare abnormal returns and Twitter sentiment
valence in the same scale, we convert both of them to Standard scores (also called
z-scores) as shown in Equation 4.10, whose means are 0 and standard deviations are
1. In Equation 4.10, z is a Standard score, x is the original score, µ and σ are the
mean and standard deviation of the population respectively.
z=

x−µ
σ

(4.10)

To see how good Twitter sentiment valence is linearly related to the ﬁrms’ abnormal returns, we select AMZN as an example, which has the largest Pearson correlation
coeﬃcient among eight ﬁrms. We illustrate the relation between AMZN’s abnormal
returns and our trust network power based method in Figure 4.3. We can see that
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our method captures abnormal returns’ ﬂuctuation very well, especially for three
abnormal returns’ big peaks in Figure 4.3. Such kind of linear correlation can be
used for other advanced analysis, for example, event study [215, 232] and stock price
prediction.

Figure 4.3. Pearson correlation between AMZN’s abnormal returns
and trust network power based Twitter sentiment valence

4.5.5 Linear Regression Correlation
In the above, Pearson correlation coeﬃcient is used to measure the pairwise linear correlation between abnormal stock returns and Twitter sentiment valence. In
addition to that, by taking into account that abnormal stock returns might exhibit
auto-correlation property [209], we also construct a linear regression model which includes both Twitter sentiment valence and historical abnormal returns, as in Equation
4.11.
ARd = α + β ∗ T SVd + γ ∗ CV + εd

(4.11)

Here, α is the intercept. β is the coeﬃcient that we are going to investigate, and
ε denotes a zero mean disturbance term. CV stands for control variables. Although
there are many factors (i.e., trading volume, volatility) that can be considered as
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control variables [193,209], in this work, we consider the previous three days’ abnormal
returns as control variables. Thus, we can rewrite the regression Equation 4.11 as in
Equation 4.12.
ARd = α + β ∗ T SVd +

i=3
X

γi ∗ ARd−i + εd

(4.12)

i=1

We test Equation 4.12 with T SV calculated by three methods we mentioned above.
We list estimated coeﬃcient β, standard error of the estimation SE, t statistic for a
test that the coeﬃcient is zero tStat, p-value for the t statistic pV alue, and adjusted
R-square adjR2 in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4.
Regression results of abnormal returns for eight ﬁrms
Firms

AAPL

FB

GOOG

NFLX

AMZN

GE

MSFT

GILD

TSV methods

coeﬃcient β

SE

tStat

pV alue

adjR2

T SVequal

0.0127

0.0026

4.9243

2.07 ∗ 10−6

0.1241

10−8

1.95 ∗

T SVf ollowers

0.1103

0.0187

5.9106

T SVpower

0.0365

0.0051

7.1752

2.45 ∗ 10−11

0.2359

T SVequal

0.0016

0.0020

0.7919

0.4296

0.0372

T SVf ollowers

0.0166

0.0246

0.6751

0.5006

0.0361

T SVpower

0.0113

0.0086

1.3162

0.1900

0.0437

0.1717

T SVequal

0.0066

0.0029

2.3166

0.0218

0.0115

T SVf ollowers

0.0700

0.0407

1.7200

0.0873

-0.0030

T SVpower

0.0398

0.0105

3.8031

2.02 ∗ 10−4

0.0624

T SVequal

0.0077

0.0045

1.6902

0.0929

0.0094

T SVf ollowers

0.2252

0.0991

2.2725

0.0244

0.0231

T SVpower

0.1388

0.0244

5.6836

T SVequal

0.0048

0.0028

1.6936

5.99 ∗

10−8

0.0923
3.41 ∗

10−8

0.1595
0.0204

T SVf ollowers

0.3276

0.0565

5.7987

T SVpower

0.1228

0.0154

7.9768

2.57 ∗ 10−13

0.2842

T SVequal

0.0007

0.0013

0.5824

0.5611

-0.0133

T SVf ollowers

0.0014

0.0347

0.0400

0.9681

-0.0154

T SVpower

0.0298

0.0150

1.9911

0.0481

0.0089

T SVequal

0.0010

0.0016

0.6095

0.5430

-0.0184

T SVf ollowers

0.0588

0.0423

1.3908

0.1662

-0.0087

T SVpower

0.0822

0.0155

5.2984

3.77 ∗

10−7

0.1744

0.1300

T SVequal

0.0023

0.0017

1.3519

0.1783

-0.0050

T SVf ollowers

0.0603

0.1161

0.5189

0.6045

-0.0146

T SVpower

0.0453

0.0189

2.3970

0.0177

0.0185
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From Table 4.4, we observe the same performance pattern as in Pearson correlation
coeﬃcient test. In other words, after considering the stock abnormal returns’ possible
auto-correlation property, still, our trust network power based method outperforms
other two methods. Similarly, in Table 4.4, we highlight the lowest p-value and the
highest adjusted R-square among three methods with bold font. Therefore, the main
hypothesis of this work that the users reputation built by using our trust management
system, helps in making better predictions of the stock market is conﬁrmed.

4.5.6 A Limitation – Number of Tweets
Although in the above experiments our trust network power based method outperformed other two baseline methods for all eight ﬁrms we selected, we ﬁnd that to
achieve this each ﬁrm must have enough number of daily tweets available. Remember
that all eight ﬁrms we selected have more than 40 average daily tweets.
To see the inﬂuence of the number of daily tweets, we select another ﬁrm – Bank
of America Corp (BAC), as an example. BAC is the 9th most mentioned ﬁrm in our
Twitter dataset. And it has an average of 31.4192 daily tweets during our testing
period. As before, we do the Pearson correlation test for BAC with three methods
for all the 167 trading days. We list the results in Table 4.5. From Table 4.5 we can
see that, in this case, T SVequal performs better than our method T SVpower .
Table 4.5.
Pearson correlation coeﬃcients of BAC
Testing period

T SVequal

T SVf ollowers
PCC

p-value

T SVpower

PCC

p-value

PCC

p-value

All 167 trading days

0.1877

0.015

0.0244

0.755

0.1589

0.040

Subset40

0.1471

0.464

-0.1773

0.376

0.4378

0.022

Since BAC has only a few tweets on many trading days, instead of testing for all
the 167 trading days, we also select a subset of trading days on which BAC has more
than 40 tweets available and we call it Subset40. By setting a threshold of 40 for
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the number of daily tweets, Subset40 has 27 trading days. Also, we test the Pearson
correlation coeﬃcient for Subset40 and include its results in Table 4.5. We can see that
if we have enough number of tweets (in this example more than or equal to 40 daily
tweets) to infer Twitter sentiment valence for BAC, still our method can outperform
other two methods. Besides performance, we think that in order to get reliable
analysis results, it is necessary to have suﬃcient tweets. Note that, compared with
the diﬀerence between T SVequal and T SVpower for all 167 trading days, our method
performs much better in Subset40. Also, we compare three methods’ performance of
BAC in Subset40 in Figure 4.4. For example, our method T SVpower can capture day
10’s drop, while other two methods are not able to capture it.

Figure 4.4. Comparison of BAC’s performance in Subset40

4.6 Chapter Summary
In this work, we used the abnormal stock returns as ground truth for our trust
management system. For this reason we veriﬁed the hypothesis that the users reputation, built by the inter trust among them, using our trust management system,
helps in making better predictions of abnormal stock returns. So, we collected a
group of users who were interested in stock market activities from Twitter. Based
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on tweets posted by the users, we selected eight ﬁrms which were the top eight mentioned ﬁrms in the data set. Correspondingly, those eight ﬁrms’ stock market data
was collected from Yahoo! Finance. For the users on Twitter, we adapted our trust
management framework [210] and constructed a user-to-user trust network. Based
on this user-to-user trust network, we calculated for users’ power or reputation in a
simple way.
To see whether or not Twitter sentiment information could help to analyze stock
market, for each ﬁrm, we analyzed Pearson correlation coeﬃcients between Twitter
sentiment valence and the ﬁrm’s abnormal returns. Compared with existing works,
when accumulating Twitter sentiments, we took into account tweets’ authors. Authors were weighted and diﬀerentiated by their reputation or power in the whole
community. Compared with treating all the authors equally or simply weighting authors by the number of their followers, we could see that our trust network based
reputation mechanism could amplify the correlation between a speciﬁc ﬁrm’s Twitter
sentiment valence and the ﬁrm’s stock abnormal returns.
To further consider the auto-correlation property of abnormal stock returns, we
also constructed a linear regression model, in which the previous three days’ abnormal
returns were considered as control variables. Again, our results showed that by using
our trust network power based method to weight tweets, we did linear regression
better than other two methods.
However, our work also has some limitations. First of all, we did experiments only
for a period (from 01/01/2015 through 08/31/2015). It is possible that the relation
pattern we found here does not apply to other periods of time [209]. Therefore,
testing our method on multiple data sets and periods of time is part of our future
work. Furthermore, our study showed that when the number of tweets about a ﬁrm
was very small; the Twitter sentiment valence might not be able to reﬂect the stock
market. So, in the future, we will consider collecting more data or think of how to
use available data more eﬀectively. Finally, we will further tune the used reputation
algorithms.
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5 A TRUST MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD COMPUTING
PLATFORMS
5.1 Introduction
Nowadays, cloud computing platforms are becoming more and more widely used
and welcomed in many ﬁelds, including e-commerce, web applications, data storage,
healthcare, gaming, mobile social networks, and so on [233, 234]. Cloud computing
platforms are able to provide customers with Internet-based services, without requiring customers to purchase a large number of hardware [235]. However, security
and privacy are still two big concerns for cloud computing platforms and applications [236, 237]. For example, data conﬁdentiality and auditability are two important
properties for cloud vendors to convince customers to put their sensitive information
in cloud [233]. Also, it is important for cloud vendors to provide available and reliable services, which is called business continuity and service availability in [233], to
customers.
According to [233], cloud can be classiﬁed into public cloud and private cloud
depending on their owners and serving objects. Public cloud is generally developed
by big companies, e.g. Google and Amazon, and is designed to be accessible to public
customers in a pay-as-you-go manner, such as Amazon EC2. While private cloud is
usually owned by private companies or organizations. And only internal users have
the access to use private cloud. In reality, as cloud can be owned by diﬀerent owners,
it is possible that a single mission or task will involve or be distributed over multiple
clouds. In this work, we call this scenario multi-clouds environment as in [238].
In cloud computing platforms, on one hand, a single task might be distributed
over multiple computer nodes. For example, one computer node pre-processes the
data, the second computer node might do the data mining tasks, and the third one

107
visualizes the results to end users. On the other hand, a single computer node may
be shared by multiple tasks. In such cases, it is possible that tasks are shared with
some other untrustworthy tasks or organizations.
Faced with such new challenges, the old security model that consisted in defending
the perimeter of the system is not valid anymore. We have to assume that whatever
defense mechanisms we deploy in the systems, sooner or later will be breached by attackers. We have to design systems that can survive various attacks, with a calculated
and acceptable degradation in performance by using additional resources planned for
such conditions. Therefore, besides traditional security measures, such as cryptography, access control policies, and so on, more measures should be taken in cloud
computing platforms. For example, when multiple cloud computing platforms are involved, not only load balance and redundancy should be taken into account, but also
the trustworthiness of computing nodes, groups of nodes, tasks and cloud computing
platforms should be taken into account.
In this chapter, we apply our measurement theory based trust management framework for cloud computing platforms, which addresses three levels of trust measurement: ﬂow level trust, node level trust and task level trust. Both of the node level
trust and the task level trust are dependent on the ﬂow level trust. Although packets
information is more detailed than ﬂow information and may also be available in some
cases, typically the amount of packets is much higher than the amount of ﬂows such
that it is very diﬃcult to handle packets information [239]. Flows, which are the
aggregation of packets, somehow also exhibit traﬃc features between the sender and
the receiver. Therefore, in this work, we use ﬂow level measurements rather than
packet level measurements. To summarize, we estimate trustworthiness based on the
network ﬂow traﬃc.
We show that, by using trust metrics - trustworthiness and conﬁdence, we are
able to help cloud vendors or cloud customers to estimate both computing nodes’
and tasks’ trust. Based on the evaluation of trust, in cases that there are attacks, it
could help cloud administrators to migrate tasks from suspect nodes to trustworthy
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nodes. Also, it can help cloud administrators to dynamically allocate resources to
tasks by the guidance of our trust management framework.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: we introduce literature works in
Section 5.2. We illustrate the usage of our trust management framework in Section
5.3. We show the usage of our trust management framework by an attack example in
Section 5.4. We propose a trust-reliability assessment algorithm and show its usage
for resource conﬁguration in Section 5.5. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section
5.6.

5.2 Background and Related Works
As security is an very hot research topic in cloud, there are many works have been
proposed to detect attacks and diminish their damage [237, 240].
There exist several works talking about trust between cloud vendors and cloud
customers. For example, in [241], author explored the role of mutual trust between
cloud providers and cloud customers in data storage systems. In [242], authors listed
several factors which need to be considered in estimating trust, such as ownership,
control, transparency, and so on. Therefore, we can see that there is a big need in
cloud computing platforms for cloud vendors to be able to provide trust information
to their customers.
On the other hand, there are also some works focusing on trust or risk assessment
in distributed systems. In [243], authors deﬁned risk using the concept of fuzzy belief
to deal with risk’s uncertainty property. In [244], authors established a network for
hosts, connected with ﬂows among them. And they explored both PageRank and
HITS algorithms in their work. Similarly, in [245], authors assessed hosts’ risk based
on their ﬂows and host network.
In this work, we adapt and apply our measurement theory based trust management framework to fulﬁll the gap between the need of trust and analysis of trust
in cloud computing platforms. Basically, we provide an approach for cloud vendors

109
or administrators to assess trust of nodes and tasks in cloud environment. Also,
it provides cloud vendors guidance for dynamically allocating resources. Compared
with other existing works, in addition to the trustworthiness, we also had conﬁdence
included in our trust management framework. Conﬁdence can be used to measure
how certain the trustworthiness evaluation is. Furthermore, we develop a reconﬁguration capability of tasks over elements of the system, such as tasks, computing nodes,
networks, based on their trust values and the required trust by various tasks [246].

5.3 Trust Management in Cloud Computing Platforms
Trust has been shown to be very helpful in many decision making ﬁelds, such as
IT systems, sociology [78], electronic commerce [142], Inter of Things [143], and so on.
Therefore, there are many proposed trust management frameworks in literature [157].
In this work, we apply our measurement theory based trust management framework [210] in cloud computing platforms. Our trust management framework has two
metrics: trustworthiness and conﬁdence, as deﬁned in Section 3.3.2.

5.3.1 Measurement of Flows
As indicated in Section 5.1, we measure trust based on network ﬂows among
computing nodes in cloud computing platforms. In our approach, we treat each
network ﬂow as an atomic measurement.
We assume that source and destination of ﬂows are known such that we know the
truster and trustee correspondingly. And ﬂows between the truster and the trustee
are treated like conversations or observations between them. In order to know the
trust relationship, we need to analyze traﬃc ﬂows. Basically, anomalous ﬂows can
decrease trustworthiness. To distinguish anomalous traﬃc from normal traﬃc, there
exist many methodologies, such as machine learning-based method [247–249], rulebased method [250], and so on.
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Traﬃc anomaly detection is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we use
anomaly detection results as our trust management framework’s input. For example,
we can assume that we have proﬁles which specify both normal and abnormal traﬃc
patterns for each ﬂow, i.e., average and peak rates, banned destinations, and so
on. For a given traﬃc, we compare it with the proﬁle. Besides continuous anomaly
scores, our trust management system can also handle binary cases. In some cases,
the output of anomaly detection is a binary result (normal and abnormal) rather
than a continuous value [247]. For example, classiﬁcation algorithms and clustering
algorithms will classify traﬃc into two categories. Depending on the input from
anomaly detection, corresponding distributions can be applied. For example, we can
use Beta distribution for binary inputs. For other discrete cases, we can use Dirichlet
distribution.
In the following of this chapter, we assume the output of anomaly detection is
continuous and is normalized into the range of [0, 1]. So, we use Normal distribution
as an example to illustrate our trust management framework and its usage in cloud
computing platforms. And we use the set of measurements M = {m1 , m2 , ...mk } to
denote the anomaly detection results.

5.3.2 Trust Modeling: Trustworthiness and Conﬁdence
We evaluate ﬂow trust based on the ﬂows’ anomaly detection results. As deﬁned
in Section 3.3.2, we calculate m as the mean of M = {m1 , m2 , ...mk }, and conﬁdence
is derived from M ’s error. As indicated by [72], conﬁdence should have two important
properties. First, given a ﬁxed conﬂict ratio of evidence or measurements (i.e. positive
vs. negative), conﬁdence should increase as the amount of evidence or measurements
increases. Second, given a ﬁxed amount of evidence or measurements, conﬁdence
increases when the conﬂict ratio decreases.
We show these two properties in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. In this example, we only
consider two possible anomaly scores {0, 1}. In other words, we consider that the
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anomaly detection results are either positive or negative. We can see that when the
total number of measurements is ﬁxed, conﬁdence achieves smallest when the ratio
of positive and negative measurements is 1 : 1. Also, in Figure 5.2, we ﬁx the conﬂict
ratio equaling to 1 : 1, which means that we have the same number of positive and
negative measurements. We can see that conﬁdence monotonically increases with the
number of total measurements. In other words, more measurements can make the
trustworthiness estimation more conﬁdent.
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Figure 5.1. The conﬂict ratio’s eﬀect on conﬁdence
As nodes or objects’ behavior may change over time, trust assessment should be
dynamically updated as well. Therefore, similar to the Twitter application, we divide
ﬂows based on time. For example, ﬂows collected within one hour can be considered
as a measurement window. The length of the time window will be tuned in future
works.
Besides this, trust assessment should also highlight more on recent measurements
than old measurements, as recent measurements are more likely to reﬂect the real time
situation. Therefore, we forget the previous measurements by a forgetting factor σ,
where σ ≤ 1. Instead of treating previous measurements as important as current
measurements, for each time window, we discount previous measurements by σ. The
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Figure 5.2. The total number of measurements’ eﬀect on conﬁdence

larger is σ, the more important old measurements are. When σ = 1, we consider old
measurements as equally important as current measurements. When σ = 0, we only
use the most recent measurements to estimate trustworthiness. Note that in each
new window, old measurements is discounted by σ. So the old measurements will be
discounted by σ, σ 2 , σ 3 , and so on, as time goes on.
By discounting the old measurements, instead of using mean, we use weighted
mean as trustworthiness m. Correspondingly, we use weighted sample variance to
calculate conﬁdence. We show them in Equation 5.1. Here, for the most recent
measurements, weights are 1. And for previous measurements, weights are discounted,
i.e. σ. Note that, for each mi in a single time window, all the anomaly detection
results are treated equally important and it follows the deﬁnition of Equations 3.1
and 3.2.

sP

Pi=k
m=

i=1 wi ∗ mi
P
i=k
i=1 wi

r=

i=k
i=1

wi ∗ (mi − m)2
Pi=k
i=1 wi

(5.1)

There exists a trade-oﬀ between the amount of available measurements and timely
trust information. If we set σ too large, we will have more measurements available
but lose the relative importance of the recent measurements. On the other hand, if we
set σ too small, we can track trust estimation in real time, but with limited amount of
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measurements. We show the eﬀect of forgetting factor in Figure 5.3. In this example,
we divide time into 20 time windows. And each time window has 5 new measurements.
For the ﬁrst 10 time windows, we assume they have 4 positive measurements and 1
negative measurement. Therefore, for the ﬁrst 10 time windows, m = 0.8. For the
next 10 time windows, we assume that the object changes its behavior, and each time
window has 1 positive measurement and 4 negative measurements. We can see that,
given smaller forgetting factors (forget more rapidly), m decreases more rapidly. On
the other hand, smaller forgetting factors result in lower conﬁdence.
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Figure 5.3. The eﬀect of forgetting factor

5.3.3 Trust of Nodes
In [245], authors argued that the risk of a node/host is determined by both
its incoming and outgoing links/ﬂows. It is reasonable to assume that if a node
sends/receives a large amount of anomalous ﬂows, it may execute some malicious missions or it may be compromised. In addition to that, in cloud computing platforms,
we consider that nodes’ trust will also be aﬀected by the tasks that are executing on
the nodes. For example, if we know that a malicious task is running on a speciﬁc
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node, although the node’s incoming and outgoing ﬂows have not exhibited anomaly
yet, we will still treat this node as a suspect.
In summary, we take all the incoming and outgoing ﬂows into account. Similarly,
all the tasks running on the node will be considered. We represent measurements of
all the incoming ﬂows and outgoing ﬂows as f lowI and f lowO correspondingly. And
all the tasks running on a node are denoted as T ask = {task1 , task2 , ...taskn }. For
some types of attacks, incoming and outgoing ﬂows are of diﬀerent importance, we
might consider using weighted mean of them. However, in the following simulated
example, we consider that incoming and outgoing ﬂows are equally important. And
we use wf low to denote the weight of incoming and outgoing ﬂows.
By considering ﬂows’ trust and tasks’ trust as two factors to determine trust for
computing nodes, we represent it as in Equation 5.2. Here, wf low and wtask control
the relative weight of ﬂows’ trust to tasks’ trust. By following the error propagation
theory, conﬁdence of the node can be calculated as in Equation 5.3.
P
wf low ∗ mf low + i=n
wtask ∗ mtaski
mnode =
Pi=1
i=n
wf low + i=1 wtask
cnode = 1 − 2 ∗ [(

wf low ∗ (1 − cf low )
)2
P
2 ∗ (wf low + i=n
w
)
i=1 task

i=n
X

1
wtask ∗ (1 − ctaski )
+
(
)2 ] 2
Pi=n
2 ∗ (wf low + i=1 wtask )
i=1

(5.2)

(5.3)

5.3.4 Trust of Tasks
Similar to trust of computing nodes, as tasks are involved with both ﬂows and
nodes (a set of nodes N ode = {node1 , node2 , ...nodeN }), we consider both of them in
evaluating tasks’ trust. However, compared with trust of nodes, where we consider
all the incoming and outgoing ﬂows, here we only take ﬂows that belong to the corresponding tasks into account. In other words, a task’s ﬂow trust is only derived from
its own ﬂows (both incoming and outgoing ﬂows). Similarly, we assume that incoming
and outgoing ﬂows are equally important in the following simulated example.
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Similar to trust of nodes, we ﬁrst calculate ﬂow trust for each task. Also, we use
the weighted mean of ﬂow trust and nodes’ trust to calculate trust for tasks, as shown
in Equations 5.4 and 5.5.
mtask =

wf low ∗ mf low +
wf low +

ctask = 1 − 2 ∗ [(
i=N
X
+
(
i=1

Pi=N

Pi=1
i=N
i=1

wnode ∗ mnodei
wnode

wf low ∗ (1 − cf low )
)2
P
2 ∗ (wf low + i=N
w
)
node
i=1

1
wnode ∗ (1 − cnodei )
)2 ] 2
Pi=N
2 ∗ (wf low + i=1 wnode )

(5.4)

(5.5)

5.4 A Simulation Example
In this section, we show how to use our trust management framework in cloud
computing platforms. We show an example of possible attack in cloud computing
platforms.

5.4.1 An Attack Example in Cloud Computing Platforms

Figure 5.4. An attack example in cloud computing platforms
In Figure 5.4, we show an example of attack in cloud computing platforms. In
this example, we have 6 tasks which are running on 5 computing nodes. Among 6
tasks, tasks T 2, T 4 and T 6 distribute over multiple nodes and have incoming and/or
outgoing ﬂows among these nodes. For tasks T 1, T 3 and T 5, we assume that they
can be accomplished in a single node such that there is no ﬂow for them. Also, we
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assume that each node has proﬁles for all the tasks running on it, and then it is able
to justify anomalous and normal ﬂows.
We assume that task T 4 is a malicious task. Figure 5.4 (a) to (c) show the process
of the attack. In (a), it begins to launch attack on node N 3. In the next step, node
N 2 is compromised and begins to send malicious ﬂows to node N 5, which is also
running task T 4. Also, as node N 2 is compromised, ﬂows between node N 2 and node
N 1 will be anomalous as well. Finally in (c), node N 5 is also compromised. In this
example, we assume that nodes are compromised and not only task T 4 is aﬀected,
but also other tasks running on the same nodes will be aﬀected. In Figure 5.4, red
lines represent anomalous ﬂows, and blue lines represent normal ﬂows. We will see
how the malicious task (task T 4) will aﬀect other nodes and tasks.
In this example, we have 3 time windows (T W 1, T W 2, T W 3), which correspond
to the scenarios of Figure 5.4 (a), (b) and (c). In addition to T W 1, T W 2, T W 3,
we assume that there exists a prior time window T W 0, which includes the prior
knowledge. Initially, in T W 0, we assume that all the nodes, tasks, and ﬂows are
normal. Therefore, we let m = 1 and c = 1 for all the nodes and tasks. Regarding
ﬂows, in T W 0, we assume that there are 10 normal ﬂows for each link in Figure 5.4.
For example, there exist 10 normal ﬂows between node N 1 and node N 2. Obviously,
all the ﬂow trust initially has m = 1 and c = 1 as well.
For links among each pair of nodes, we assume that it contains 10 ﬂows in each
time window. Therefore, node N 2 has 30 incoming and outgoing ﬂows in total in
each time window, as it has three links with nodes N 1, N 3 and N 5. As we indicated
before, for simplicity, we consider incoming ﬂows as important as outgoing ﬂows. In
other words, 10 is the total number of ﬂows between a pair of nodes, no matter how
many of them are incoming ﬂows or outgoing ﬂows. For time windows T W 1, T W 2,
T W 3, we assume that each link contains 10 normal ﬂows (for each measurement
mi = 1) if the link is not aﬀected (blue links). Otherwise, we assume that all 10 ﬂows
are anomalous (red links), which means that their measurement results are mi = 0.
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In Table 5.1, we list the trust information for all the nodes and tasks for 4 time
windows. As we assume that initially all the nodes and tasks are not aﬀected, we
assign m = 1 and c = 1 for them. In this example, we let the forgetting factor
σ = 0.8. To consider the importance of ﬂow trust relative to tasks and nodes’ trust,
we let wf low = 2 ∗ wtask and wf low = 2 ∗ wnode correspondingly. Also, note that within
each time window, we update nodes and tasks’ trust using the previous time window’s
results as prior knowledge.
Table 5.1.
Trust information for all the nodes and tasks in 4 time windows
T W 0(m, c)

T W 1(m, c) T W 2(m, c)

T W 3(m, c)

T1

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(0.84, 0.92)

T2

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(0.76, 0.90)

(0.57, 0.91)

T3

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(0.84, 0.92)

T4

(1, 1)

(0.86, 0.93)

(0.65, 0.93)

(0.50, 0.95)

T5

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(0.72, 0.88)

(0.60, 0.91)

T6

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(0.79, 0.91)

N1

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(0.84, 0.92)

(0.71, 0.92)

N2

(1, 1)

(0.87, 0.93)

(0.65, 0.93)

(0.47, 0.94)

N3

(1, 1)

(0.72, 0.88)

(0.60, 0.91)

(0.43, 0.92)

N4

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(0.77, 0.88)

N5

(1, 1)

(1, 1)

(0.85, 0.93)

(0.65, 0.93)

From Table 5.1, we can see that although initially only task T 4 is malicious, it can
aﬀect other nodes and tasks as well. First of all, as task T 4 is distributed over nodes
N 2, N 3 and N 5, their trustworthiness will decrease a lot, which means that nodes
N 2, N 3 and N 5 are compromised by malicious task T 4. In addition to that, we can
see that it also aﬀects tasks T 2, T 5 and T 6, as they are running on the aﬀected nodes
N 2, N 3, and N 5. Finally, in T W 3, we can see that the malicious eﬀect spread to all

118
the nodes and tasks in this example. They all decrease their trust from the initial
status (m = 1, c = 1).
From Table 5.1, we show that our trust management framework is able to derive
trust information for nodes and tasks in cloud computing platforms. The derived
trust information is very helpful for cloud administrators to make decisions. When
trust decrease is detected in any nodes, cloud administrators might need to monitor or investigate eﬀorts on those suspect nodes. After investigation, corresponding
measures should be taken to diminish potential damage. For example, tasks T 2, T 5
and T 6 can be migrated in advance if we ﬁnd that nodes they are running on are
decreasing their trust. Or, at least alarms should be arisen for further investigation.
Alarms and administrator’s decision making will be part of our future works.

5.5 Trust, Redundancy and Reliability
5.5.1 Trust-Reliability Assessment
In Section 5.3, we have introduced how to evaluate trustworthiness and conﬁdence
for tasks and nodes. It is important for both cloud vendors and customers to monitor
trustworthiness (m) and conﬁdence (c). Compared with existing works, in addition
to the trustworthiness itself, we also measure how certain the trustworthiness evaluation is with conﬁdence. Since trust is related with system reliability, to consider
trustworthiness and conﬁdence together we call it trust-reliability assessment. And
we propose an algorithm to assess trust-reliability in Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, we ﬁrst shift trustworthiness by (m−0.5), since 0.5 means neutral
trustworthiness. To consider m and c together, we multiply shifted m with c. And
then it is normalized into range of [0, 1]. Finally, we use an exponential function
to assess trust-reliability, in which λ is related with m. Basically, if both m and c
are high, we want the corresponding trust-reliability assessment result being high as
well (controlled by λ1). Otherwise, if m is low, we want that the trust-reliability
assessment result decreases dramatically (controlled by λ2). Therefore, typically,
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Algorithm 1: Trust-Reliability Assessment Algorithm
Input: m; c; lamda1; lamda2; mthreshold;
Output: Trust-Reliability
1
2
3

if m ≥ mthreshold: ;
then
lamda = lamda1 ;

4

end

5

else

6

lamda = lamda2 ;

7

end

8

Normalizedmc = (2 * (m - 0.5) * c + 1) / 2 ;

9

Trust-Reliability = exp(- lamda * (1 - Normalizedmc)) ;

10

return Trust-Reliability ;

we have λ1 ≤ λ2. To better illustrate this, we plot Figures 5.5 and 5.6. Here,
mthreshold = 0.5, λ1 = 4, and λ2 = 8.
1
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Figure 5.5. Trust-reliability assessment results vs. m
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Figure 5.6. Trust-reliability assessment results vs. c

In Figure 5.5, we ﬁx the conﬁdence (c = 0.2 and c = 0.8 correspondingly). We
can see that when m is low, the trust-reliability assessment result is always low. On
the other hand, for high m (when m is greater than mthreshold), the trust-reliability
assessment result increases dramatically when conﬁdence increases. For low c, the
trust-reliability assessment result does not increase too much even if we increase m.
Similarly, we ﬁx the trustworthiness (m = 0.2 and m = 0.8) in Figure 5.6. We can see
that if trustworthiness m is low, the trust-reliability assessment result is always low
no matter how conﬁdent it is. If trustworthiness m is high, then increasing conﬁdence
can help to increase the trust-reliability assessment result as well. In summary, to
get a high trust-reliability assessment result, both m and c must be high.
We also show the trust-reliability assessment results for the attack example (Figure
5.4) in Table 5.2. Similarly, we can see that task 4 can potentially aﬀect all the nodes
and other tasks in this example.

5.5.2 Redundancy
Redundancy is a basic requirement in many networking frameworks to provide
reliable services. On the one hand, it increases services’ reliability by providing back-
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Table 5.2.
Trust-reliability assessment results for all the nodes and tasks in 4 time windows
TW0

TW1

TW2

TW3

T1

1

1

1

0.4729

T2

1

1

T3

1

1

T4

1

T5

1

1

T6

1

1

N1

1

1

N2

1

0.5360 0.2365

0.0146

N3

1

0.2936 0.1948

0.0109

N4

1

1

N5

1

1

0.3451 0.1746
1

0.5164 0.2365

0.4729
0.1353

0.2936 0.1948
1

0.3889

0.4729 0.2931

1

0.3501

0.4976 0.2365

ups for services. On the other hand, it requires more resources and in consequence,
has a higher cost. Therefore, there is a trade-oﬀ between the degree of redundancy
and cost.
In cases that tasks have a certain level of redundancy, it means that there are
multiple methods or paths to implement them. For each method, we can use Equations 5.4 and 5.5 to evaluate m and c. Given more than one backup methods, we
need to aggregate methods ﬁrst. We use Figure 5.7 as an example to illustrate the
aggregate methodology. In this example, Task 1 requires three nodes (p1 (N 1, N 2,
N 3) or p2 (N 4, N 5, N 6)) to implement it. It also distributes two copies (p1 and p2)
of the task over six nodes. For each single method p1 or p2, we have shown how to
calculate trust for tasks in Equations 5.4 and 5.5. Given each method’s trust, we will
aggregate them together and evaluate trust metrics for the replicated task.
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Figure 5.7. An example of redundancy

In the above example, there exist more than one implementation for the task (also
called redundancy), we follow the redundancy theory (Equation 5.6) to aggregate
them, as shown in Equations 5.7 and 5.8. Here, we assume that implementations are
independent from each other. Basically, Equation 5.6 calculates the probability that
at least one of two independent events happens. For example, if we have (m1 , c1 ) =
(0.8, 0.8), and (m2 , c2 ) = (0.9, 0.9), then (m, c) = (0.98, 0.9717). We can see that
by adding more redundancy, we can increase tasks’ m, c, and the trust-reliability
assessment results. However, it requires more resources.
P (EA ∪ EB) = P (EA) + P (EB) − P (EA ∩ EB)

(5.6)

m = m1 + m2 − m1 ∗ m2

(5.7)

r
c=1−2∗

(

(1 − m1 ) ∗ (1 − c2 ) 2
(1 − m2 ) ∗ (1 − c1 ) 2
)
) +(
2
2

(5.8)
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5.5.3 Resource Conﬁguration
In the cloud computing scenario, given a set of devices or resources, the service
providers or vendors need to assign right resources to applications. Suppose that
the vendor has a set of candidate devices which can provide functional usage for an
application; however, these resources might have diﬀerent trust-reliability assessment
results. At the same time, applications might also have diﬀerent requirements.
By using Equations 5.4 and 5.5 and Algorithm 1, we are able to calculate and
assess trust-reliability for each implementation. And if there exists redundancy, we
use Equations 5.7, 5.8 and trust-reliability assessment algorithm together to evaluate
trust for the application. Therefore, we can do trust-reliability assessment for each
possible assembles of resources.
Note that, our trust-reliability assessment results are dynamic based on real-time
monitored traﬃc. This information can also be used to dynamically conﬁgure the resources for the applications. In summary, by using our trust management framework,
we can guide vendors for resource conﬁguration.

5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we adapted and applied our measurement theory based trust
management framework for cloud computing platforms. It consists of two metrics:
trustworthiness and conﬁdence. It begins from ﬂow measurements. We derived trust
of nodes based on all the tasks running on them and all the ﬂows they send and/or
receive. Similarly, for tasks, their trust depends on the ﬂows and the nodes which
implement the tasks. We provided a way for cloud vendors to estimate nodes and
tasks’ trust.
We used an example of attack to illustrate the usage of our trust management
framework. We showed that although tasks themselves are not malicious initially,
they can be aﬀected and be compromised by other tasks if we are not aware of nodes’
trust.
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To diminish the damage, redundancy is an important feature for cloud computing
platforms. We showed that by adding more copies or paths for tasks, it can increase
their trust-reliability assessment results. Also, we provided a potential way for the
administrators to dynamically allocate resource to tasks. For example, when the
trust-reliability of a task decreases below a threshold, the administrator can allocate
some additional paths for the task. While if the trust-reliability of a task is very high,
the administrators might decrease the degree of its redundancy.
In summary, our trust management framework is able to provide guidance information for the administrators or even cloud customers to make decisions, e.g. migrating
tasks from suspect nodes to trustworthy nodes, dynamically allocating resource, and
managing the trade-oﬀ between the degree of redundancy and cost of resource.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we ﬁrst provided a survey of existing trust management frameworks.
We investigated how trust is deﬁned by researchers from diﬀerent disciplines and how
can it be represented in the ﬁeld of computer science. We also presented diﬀerent
trust inference schemes. Many of them have two important formulas: transitivity and
aggregation formulas. Furthermore, we reviewed some potential trust attacks in trust
management frameworks. We described four types of behaviors in these attacks. We
analyzed existing frameworks vulnerabilities to the attacks. If they are robust to the
attacks, we listed which defense mechanisms they use.
Then, we developed a measurement theory based trust management framework
that aims to provide an intuitive way to represent and manage cognitive trust. For
cognitive trust, we introduced two trust metrics: trustworthiness and conﬁdence. We
showed with experiments on two real online social communities data sets the validity
of our framework, as well as its enormous potential usage in various social network
applications. Our results showed that diﬀerent applications or data sets have diﬀerent
trust inference patterns. Therefore, our framework is signiﬁcantly important because
it serves as an underlying fundamental for other schemes which focus on speciﬁc trust
inference formulas.
We applied our trust management framework in two applications: stock market
analysis and cloud computing scenarios. In the ﬁrst application, we used the abnormal
stock returns as ground truth for our trust management framework. Our experimental
results showed that the users power/reputation, built by the inter trust among them,
using our trust management system, can help in making better analysis of abnormal
stock returns. Compared with treating all the authors equally or simply weighting
authors by the number of their followers, we could see that our trust network based
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power/reputation mechanism could amplify the correlation between a speciﬁc ﬁrms
Twitter sentiment valence and the ﬁrms stock abnormal returns.
In the second application, we applied our trust management framework for cloud
computing scenarios in which we aimed to help detecting and preventing tasks and
computing nodes from being attacked. We provided a way for cloud vendors to estimate computing nodes and tasks trust. We used a simulated example of attack to
illustrate the usage of our trust management framework. We showed that although
tasks themselves are not malicious initially, they can be aﬀected and be compromised
by other tasks if we are not aware of nodes trust. To diminish the damage, redundancy is another important feature for cloud computing platforms. We showed that
by adding more copies or paths for tasks, it can increase their trust. Also, we proposed a trust-reliability assessment algorithm which takes both trustworthiness and
conﬁdence into account. It could provide guidance information for the administrator or even customers to make decisions, e.g., migrating tasks from suspect nodes
to trustworthy nodes, dynamically allocating a resource, and managing the trade-oﬀ
between the degree of redundancy and cost of the resource.
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